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Abstract 
Like many other urban areas around the world, Cape Town, South Africa relies on governmental 
management authorities to ensure water supply. Recently, a three year drought from 2015 to 2018 caused 
a major water shortage, threatening water supply to the city. In response, the City engaged in multiple 
mitigation efforts, amongst which was a major communications campaign to inform the public and 
encourage conservation behaviour. Drawing on literature on water crisis management and framing theory, 
this thesis analyses how the water crisis was framed in communications made available online by the City 
of Cape Town (CCT) to the public between March 2017 and March 2018. To answer this question, the 
project adopted a frames study approach to determine the types and characteristics of communication items 
released by the City of Cape Town, as the water managing authority, during the recent water crisis. The 
study established that a range of frames were employed by the CCT in communicating the drought. Through 
an analysis of the trends in the framing of the water crisis messages the study further identified the shifts in 
framing and messaging throughout the water crisis response period. Six key frames were identified, namely 
‘the City success story’; ‘obscurity and ambiguity’; ‘consumption is key’; ‘the situation is controllable’; 
‘together we can beat the drought’; and ‘us versus them’. It was found that while there may have been a 
lack of strategic planning regarding public communications which resulted in conflated messages, the 
City’s communications campaign was nonetheless effective in that it correlated with a significant drop in 
private – individual and household – water consumption which delayed Day Zero (when water supply 
would be cut-off and daily water rations would only be available at collection points for the public). The 
key implication of this study is that despite contradictions, idiosyncrasies and lack of planning, a 
heterogenous range of messages in communicating a crisis can reach and evoke appropriate responses from 
multiple audiences of the public.
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1.1 Introduction  
Many cities around the world rely on governmental structures for vital resources and services such as 
energy, water and sanitation.1 Generally, these provisions are compensated through rates and taxes paid by 
the public, and this exchange is generally unnoteworthy (Robins, 2019). However, it is significant that in 
this system the managing authority2 holds the power of responsibility to ensure supply. When the supply of 
a resource is threatened by a crisis, it is interesting to note how the managing authority perceive the situation 
and then interpret and portray that through framing to the public, as a crisis not only threatens the provision 
of a resource but also the associated power of the infrastructural authority. It is argued here that frames 
matter in managing a crisis because they are an exertion of the inherent power by the managing authority 
to influence how the situation is portrayed, perceived, understood and responded to (Laws & Rein, 2003). 
An analysis of frames illustrates how a narrative is constructed in response to the crisis and how that 
narrative can dominate the public’s perception of the situation3. For this reason, it is useful to analyse 
communications4 released by managing authorities, to grapple with the messages and identify how they are 
framed in order to explore strategic narratives, relationships between actors, and power relations 
constructed through communications.  
 
 
1 Though this is not exclusively true, for example in Cape Town where sharp levels of inequality leave many 
communities living in informal dwellings without access to such amenities (Ziervogel, 2019). 
2 The term ‘managing authority’ refers to the institutional power responsible for management and ensuring sufficient 
supply of resources. In this thesis, the managing authority is the City of Cape Town, it’s Water and Sanitation 
department and the prominent individuals involved in decision-making. It is important to note that this framing 
implies a position of power for management; this is not a supposition of the author, but rather a reflection of the 
systems in which the City of Cape Town operates. 
3 The crisis was commonly referred to as ‘the drought’, however the crisis was not only hydrogeological and as such 
this project uses the term ‘water crisis’ instead, to acknowledge the broader complex social and political aspects, 
beyond the result of low measures of rainfall. 
4 Communication items for this study included speeches, public statements, summaries, photographs, presentations, 
posters, pamphlets, information guides, infographics and a newsletter. It did not include items such as budgets, 
reports, punitive measures, strategies, policies and by-laws. For further details on sampling criteria see section 4.3 
sapling (pg. 27) and section 4.5 Limitations and challenges (pg. 31). 
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Consider the recent Cape Town water crisis. In November 2017, the City of Cape Town (CCT or the City) 
announced that without drastic water consumption reduction, water users, including residents and 
businesses, of Cape Town would face Day Zero in a matter of months. Cape Town and the Western Cape 
province had experienced consecutive dry winters between 2015 and 2017, which failed to provide enough 
rainfall to replenish supply dams and caused a drought (Ziervogel, 2019). The drought became a water 
shortage crisis when authorities could not ensure regular supply levels before the next rainy season. Day 
Zero signified the moment when the dam levels would drop below 13,5%, public supply would be cut off 
and people would have to collect a daily ration of 25 litres from one of 200 specified water points (City of 
Cape Town, 2017ao). As the municipal government for Cape Town, the City5 implemented restrictions, 
revised water tariffs and launched a city-wide campaign to encourage water conservation behaviour. The 
CCT’s water crisis (03/2017 – 03/20186) response campaign was a reactive response to the water crisis that 
hinged on the threat of Day Zero actualising, and the need for public cooperation during the crisis. The City 
issued a flood of information in the form of communications to residents and used multiple platforms and 
mechanisms to communicate with the public to avoid Day Zero becoming a reality.7 Additionally, other 
interested parties also launched campaigns regarding the water crisis and how to reduce water consumption. 
As a result of these efforts there was a significant drop in demand across Cape Town and the City was able 
to delay Day Zero until adequate rainfall in the winter of 2018 replenished supply dams and deferred Day 
Zero beyond 2019.  
 
The collective efforts to conserve water were successful in that they achieved the broader goal of deferring 
– and ultimately avoiding – Day Zero by engaging and influencing the public to participate (Robins, 2019). 
However, the crisis brought about new public awareness regarding water and with this came contesting 
views. Oftentimes, the functional efficiency of infrastructure management appears mundane; it is framed 
in a way that conceals its functioning until a malfunction of some kind causes a disturbance in that 
efficiency, revealing the operations and functioning behind said infrastructure (Robins, 2019). Experience 
over time influences the expectations associated with water access and how a drought is then perceived as 
a deviation from normal experience and expectations8 (Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016). The Cape Town water 
crisis illustrates how the water shortage caused a breakdown in the CCT’s business-as-usual operation and 
 
5 The City of Cape Town is referred to as the ‘CCT’ or ‘the City’ throughout the thesis. 
6 These dates are based on when Cape Town was declared a local disaster area (3/3/2017), and when the crisis (i.e. 
Day Zero) was announced to be officially deferred to 2019 or beyond (19/3/2017) (Ziervogel, 2019). 
7 While the City may have released many types of communications through many platforms, it does not necessarily 
mean that the communications reached or were received by all residents. 
8 Despite the unpredictability of ecosystems and natural phenomena due to natural variability and human interference, 




prompted multiple stakeholders to reconsider, reframe and redefine their understanding of and relationship 
with water. Studying the crisis offers insight into prominent perspectives within the City, and how agency, 
responsibility and risk were framed in relation to the situation at the time, as well as how the City’s framing 
of the drought shifted over this period.  
1.2 The study 
In light of the crisis, this research project analyses the way the City framed the water crisis in a subset of 
their official communication items to the public during the recent water shortage in order to contribute to 
understanding the role of public communications by city municipalities in water crisis management. In 
order to achieve this aim, the following objectives have been set to guide the research process: 
 
1. To determine the types and characteristics of communication items released by the City of Cape 
Town during the recent water crisis. 
2. To determine a range of frames employed by the CCT in communicating the drought. 
3. To analyse trends in the framing of the water crisis messages, and to identify if there were shifts in 
framing and messaging throughout the water crisis response period. 
 
The research draws on literature on water crisis management and framing theory to develop a coding 
scheme in order to analyse the types of frames that are present in the CCT’s communications (Laws & Rein, 
2003; Dolnicar et al., 2012; Wilhite et al., 2014; Kohl & Knox, 2016). While there are examples of literature 
which examine the importance of message framing in drought management or environmental management 
(Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016; Turner et al., 2016; Buurman, Mens & Dahm, 2017; Liang et al., 2018), there is 
no example that has been found which creates a coding scheme to analyse the framing of a drought or water 
crisis in communications released by the water managing authority. Analysing the CCT’s water crisis 
response communications uncovers trends and/or shifts inherent in the Cape Town water crisis.  
 
Knowledge, communication and behaviour are closely linked, and understanding how a problem or solution 
is framed is an important factor in influencing public perceptions and reactions (Dziegielewski, 1991; Liang 
et al., 2018). Key to this study are items of communication which dispatch information to the public in the 
form of posters, leaflets, television advertisements, social media as well as press releases and other official 
announcements, all of which aim to inform and encourage the audience – in this case the residents of Cape 
Town – to take action to reach objectives set by the managing authority. Central to these communications 
is framing, a process where the thinking and perceptions on a particular matter are developed and orientated, 
or reoriented, from a particular viewpoint (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Frames can function unconsciously 
4 
 
or be strategically created, and though often overlooked, are ubiquitous, providing shape and stability for 
understanding phenomena (Laws & Rein, 2003). Understanding the way the City of Cape Town framed the 
problem of, solutions to, and responsibility for the Cape Town water crisis in the communication items 
released to the public can point to contesting interpretations, dominating perspectives, conflated messages 
and associated challenges in governing and managing water during a crisis. This study adopts a qualitative 
approach and therefore does not seek to generalise about effective framing of water crises as each water 
crisis is subject to unique circumstances and localised experiences, and will be framed in a particular, 
context-specific manner. Nevertheless, the project will produce a scheme of drought and water crisis 
framing types which could be useful for analysing other cases of drought.  
1.3 Wider significance 
Water is a vital necessity for any human settlement. Goal number 6 of the Sustainable Development Goals 
[SDGs] is to secure access and availability as well as ensure sustainable management of water for all 
(United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2018). This demonstrates the importance of water 
management on the global agenda. It is also reflected in Section 27 of the Constitution of South Africa, 
which asserts that everyone has the right to sufficient water (South African Government, 2017). Over the 
last 100 years, developed parts of the world have become accustomed to effortless access to water while in 
many other parts of the world, water supply is threatened or unstable. Water contamination and pollution, 
diverted water courses, weather variation, climate change, metropolitan densification and growing 
populations with water demands that exceed supply capacity are some of the main factors contributing to 
water scarcity (UNESCO, 2018). It is therefore necessary for managing authorities to manage not only the 
quality and quantity of this vital resource and its associated infrastructure, but to also manage demand, 
particularly amongst communities who have wasteful or excessive consumption habits. This is especially 
important in times when a diminished or inadequate water supply threatens life, and when communicating 
a water crisis in order to influence a reduction in consumption can be the primary short-term mechanism 
for avoiding a full blown crisis, as has been seen with the Cape Town water shortage.  
 
Increasingly, water is recognised as one of the most valuable finite resources on the planet with roughly 
only 1,3% accessible for potable consumption (IAEA, 2011).9 Given the growing population of humankind, 
the projections for climate change and the consequential stress on water resources, it is important to 
understand how communicating water-related information works to guide behaviour at local and mass 
scales. While many cities seem to have some sort of tactical planning in place for drought, measures tend 
 




to only be implemented during times of emergency (Buurman, Mens & Dahm, 2017). In Cape Town, the 
crisis reached a point where the CCT resorted to urging the public to make major adjustments to their water 
consumption behaviour in order to avert a full-blown crisis i.e. reaching Day Zero. The City urged the 
public to participate collectively in these efforts. Some reported the Day Zero crisis as the ‘great leveller’ 
bringing disparate income levels in Cape Town closer as they faced the same plight (Robins, 2019).10 
However, a breakdown or crisis such as the threat of Day Zero brings to the surface new and competing 
understandings and framings of water and the associated rights and handling of the resource (Robins, 2019).  
 
This project examines the role and types of frames in the communications that were released during the 
water crisis. The Cape Town water crisis and the City’s subsequent response campaign is the chosen case 
study because of the urgency, relevance and ubiquity it had not only locally, but also internationally. 
Furthermore, given the projections of increased climate risk and changes in weather patterns, water 
management policy and water crisis response plans are increasingly recognised as useful and important 
devices to guide actions when such events arise. The hope is that this research can contribute in some way 
to improve crisis response and water management. 
1.4 Structure of thesis  
The thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1, Introduction, introduced the study, provided background, 
and outlines the importance of work in this field for more effective crisis management. Chapter 2 presents 
the Theoretical framework, which introduces literature and theory relevant to the project. Chapter 3 offers 
Context, by briefly describing the background of the study, the drought, and the subsequent water crisis in 
Cape Town, and situates the study area by including factors such as geography, hydrology, and water 
management in Cape Town. Chapter 4 describes the Research methods, by providing a breakdown of details 
about data collection, sampling, data analysis and limitations. Chapter 5, The framing of drought crisis 
communications by the CCT, presents the analysis and findings of the study. Chapter 6 consists of the 
project’s Discussion, which interrogates the findings of the study, identifies trends and shifts and delves 
into the relevance of the findings. Finally, chapter 7 is the Conclusion, which summarises the background 
and lead up to the Cape Town water crisis, the project undertaken, the findings of the study and answers to 
the aim and objectives of the study. It also reiterates the wider relevance of the study and notes areas for 
further study.  
 
10 While some may have seen the crisis as something that unified the disparate society of Cape Town, it is important 
to note that living with water scarcity is not a new reality for many people in South Africa (and worldwide) who rely 









This research project analyses the way the CCT framed the water crisis to the public in their official 
communications made available online during the recent water shortage in order to contribute to 
understanding the role of public communications from urban municipalities in water crisis management. In 
order to achieve this aim, a combination of theories and concepts from different disciplines are utilised. The 
project draws on water crisis management literature and framing theory, developed in the disciplines of 
environmental governance and sociology respectively, as the primary bodies of literature. The literature 
drawn upon also overlaps with urban water management literature at the scale of day-to-day operations, as 
well as water risk management literature at the macro, long-term scale. Water crisis management literature 
is used to situate the Cape Town water crisis within wider international drought management research. In 
particular, it looks at water conservation campaigns and how managing authorities communicate the status 
of a crisis, and selected responses and recommend solutions to the public. Human beings rely on 
communication to organise interactions and activities, and framing theory is useful to gain insights about 
the subliminal as well as overt messaging inherent in communications (Dziegielewski, 1991; Hurlbert & 
Gupta, 2016; Buurman, Mens & Dahm, 2017). Additionally, framing theory informs the methodological 
approach of the study. While framing literature encompasses a broad body of work, this project sought out 
framing literature that was applicable to water crisis management and public communications. The project 
also draws on literature regarding climate change and water risk management as occurrences of 
environmental crises are expected to increase with anthropocentric climate change. It is therefore useful to 
reflect on past experiences in order to minimise future risk in water management and to plan for future 
resilience.11  
 
This chapter consists of two main sections. Section 2.2 presents the theory of framing and framing studies. 
This is followed by section 2.3, which introduces literature on urban water management and water crisis 
management, after which the chapter’s conclusion follows.  
 
11 The study was conducted between October 2018 and November 2019. It is recognised that several studies on the 
Cape Town drought have subsequently been published, however, these are not included as they were not available 
during the study period. 
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2.2 The concept of framing 
This study draws on the theory of framing as the primary theoretical framework. Framing theory proposes 
that any given matter, situation or phenomena is subject to multiple interpretations; underpinning these 
perspectives are underlying frames which organise information according to particular rules of logic – i.e. 
frames – and facilitate a process of understanding (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). This is particularly relevant in 
communications and messaging where the way in which an issue is presented – or framed – affects how 
viewers make meaning of it. The concept of framing first appeared in the 1950s but gained traction in the 
1970s after Erving Goffman (1974) published Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience 
exploring the concept’s application in sociology. Goffman’s work expanded framing beyond individual 
processes of interpretation to collective schema that shaped shared interpretations of reality, which was 
particularly useful for explaining social phenomena. In the 1980s, framing research focused on sociological 
applications and analysing communications; while the following decade (1990s) the research began to focus 
more on media studies and media discourse (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). 
 
According to the theory, humans are compelled to make meaning of information and their experiences by 
applying patterns of logic or ‘frames’ which help to interpret phenomena (Laws & Rein, 2003). Frames are 
utilised in order to apply a logical structure to process and interpret information. ‘Frames’ refer to the 
underlying, schematic base for understanding phenomena, while ‘framing’ refers to the way in which 
knowledge is represented using interpretive schema which gives order, structure and a dictated 
understanding to otherwise unorganised elements (Laws & Rein, 2003). Frames prioritise some aspects of 
reality while overlooking others (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). Framing is assumed to be an everyday experience 
and since frames are socially constructed, they are subject to fluctuation and reorientation (Kohl & Knox, 
2016). Framing affects thinking, and thinking is naturally tied to action and practice. Framing can limit the 
perception on a given matter, which is reinforced, altered or rejected through reflexive thinking. A frame is 
accepted when it is understood (i.e. the knowledge is easily accessed and assimilated and it does not present 
doubt in the mind of the holder) and when there is a sense of security that lived experience is not at risk in 
any way according to the frame (Laws & Rein, 2003). Ironically, despite the presence of frames in all modes 
of communication and information processing, frames are often implicit, presumed to be obvious or 
objective, and therefore go unnoticed and do not get much consideration.  
 
Goffman’s (1974) concept of framing lends itself well to studies of news media and communications 
because it helps to explain how communications are able to provide interpretations of current issues and 
make explicit the underlying assumptions of agendas, be they intentional or incidental. In the exchange of 
information, frames are present in both the message being sent and the mind of the receiver; these are 
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distinguished as media frames and audience frames respectively (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). The filtering 
process is subjective, and frames are generally experienced as a natural, implicit aspect of making sense of 
experiences and information. However, the ubiquity of frames is also central to the construction and 
exertion of power between management and public. 
 
 The study of frames is an approach which aims to reveal insights about trends and changes related to the 
dominant ideas framing a particular event or matter, and the extent of the influence of the chosen framing 
by the party responsible for the messaging (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Studies of frames seek to make 
explicit the underlying frames of a particular event or issue. Frames hold particular relevance for the 
transmission of written information as well as persuasive mass-messaging (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). Such 
insights may help to understand the underlying dynamics and motives of governments; it also helps to 
explain why certain courses of action are chosen by management and why events may have played out as 
they did. Furthermore, the study of frames is useful for understanding power dynamics and how actors in 
management control narratives, position people, and construct the meaning of situations (Entman, 2007). 
 
There is no single method for approaching a frames study as each case is subject to unique conditions 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007). As a result there have been a range of approaches taken at the discretion of 
researchers; this heterogeneity of approaches is considered a weakness by some and necessary by others 
who believe the naturally complex range of phenomena is only possible to study through a diversity of 
approaches (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). Studies are therefore generally tailored to the matter under 
investigation and adjusted according to the intended objectives of the study, such as whether the aim is to 
capture general trends in framing, comparisons or specific details. Some of the key characteristics of frames 
studies include identifying an issue and the multiple understandings associated with the issue, as frames 
can only be applied and analysed in relation to a particular event, matter or issue (Chong & Druckman, 
2007).  
 
Studies can involve selecting data sources and sampling criteria, and developing a coding scheme with 
relevant frames for analysing data (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Developing a coding scheme can be done 
inductively or deductively; either by isolating frames from the analysed content itself, or by consulting 
similar studies and wider literature and applying theoretical concepts deductively (Chong & Druckman, 
2007).12 It is important to have clear details about how the content will be analysed, considering computer 
 
12 Creating a list of words and phrases relevant to each frame is a viable action.  
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programmes or manual options13 (Chong & Druckman, 2007). Once the aforementioned details have been 
decided upon, and content has been collected, the analysis and coding process can commence. 
2.3 Relevance of framing theory to the research question 
The Cape Town water crisis elicited a multiplicity of responses from the public, providing evidence that 
the same crisis can be understood and experienced from many different perspectives, and a managing 
authority must navigate this. In this way the drought problem, solutions, and responsibilities are subject to 
different framings. Drought is not a wholly scientific and value-neutral phenomenon; on the contrary, it can 
be utilised to assert political goals through the production and circulation of knowledge framed in relation 
to those goals (Kohl & Knox, 2016). Framing processes are inherent in policymaking and transmitting 
information that is integral for managing vital resources and therefore holds particular relevance for water 
crisis management and drought studies. 
 
Water management is inherently both scientific and political; a matter further complexified by the fact that 
understandings of crises tend to be formed during times of heightened anxiety, when access to water is 
threatened or absent (Kohl & Knox, 2016). Environmental crises, climate change and the varying associated 
phenomena such as drought, are often framed in scientific, objective and technical language, despite the 
influence of subjective values, politics and other various agendas (Kohl & Knox, 2016). While this is not 
implicitly a negative thing, the role of framing is worth considering when thinking about discourse and 
power dynamics between a government and it’s public.  
 
According to Hurlbert and Gupta (2016), adaptive governance must consider effective modes of framing 
climate change and the risks associated therewith in order to facilitate public openness to adaptation.14 Via 
framing, an issue is defined in a particular manner and a set course of action is presented accordingly, which 
impacts perceived risks amongst the public (Laws & Rein, 2003). Policy makers often frame an issue as an 
external, scientific, ‘natural’ occurrence, which shifts responsibility away from (or makes it disappear 
entirely from) the resource management authority/government or their role in managing the resource and 
associated infrastructure (Kohl & Knox, 2016).15 Vogel and Olivier (2018) suggest that perceptions and 
expressions of drought within a singular frame instead of a process defined by multiple factors and 
 
13 Manual coding may require more effort on the part of the researcher, however it also facilitates more flexibly which 
allows for the discovery of new or more nuanced frames that may not have been identified in the initial frame 
identification process. It is especially useful for qualitative studies. 
14 Droughts and floods related to climate change are particularly important given the high levels of risk and 
unpredictability associated therewith (Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016). 
15 Additionally, objective-type framing also serves to distract from climate change occurring as a result of 
anthropocentric drivers associated with industry and economics (Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016). 
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occurring over an extended period of time can limit drought responses with regards to who is affected and 
how they are affected.  
 
The framing of a drought and the suggested solutions put forward by management imply a great deal about 
the position and outlook of said managing authority. Historically, drought in South Africa has been 
frequently viewed as a threat to rural, commercial, ‘white’ agricultural farmers and the framing that 
dominates drought is scientific, objective, enduring and undoubtedly correct (Vogel & Olivier, 2018). This 
is an example of a ‘strong frame’, which has a compelling factor that resonates highly with leaders and the 
public (Chong & Druckman, 2007). This does not necessarily imply moral or intellectual strength of the 
frame; oftentimes exaggeration, fear-provocation and use of high-resonating symbols or ideologies are 
present in strong frames. Nonetheless strong frames do have persuasive force (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). The 
traditional political, technical, ‘hard-science’ approach to drought tends to overlook crucial nuances, 
focusing on market-based, supply-side responses, and less on the national management-side orientation, 
causing many stakeholders to be overlooked (Vogel & Olivier, 2018). This kind of ‘episodic framing’ 
occurs when focus is placed on a singular aspect of an issue (Crow & Lawler, 2016).16 This is perhaps why 
the Day Zero experience was so contentious, because “even though reality is multidimensional and 
complex, all our institutional organisations are oriented towards unidirectional and unidimensional 
interventions, leading to dilemma” (Neto, 2016:32).  
 
While it may be true that a unidirectional and narrow framing may fail to consider other important factors, 
the opposite but equally problematic predicament is that when an issue is framed in multiple ways, it can 
lead to fragmentation in policy and management (Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016). While climate change and 
related phenomena such as drought are widely regarded as scientific fact, the increasing risks associated 
therewith are less agreed upon, resulting in gaps in knowledge as well as slow and reluctant adaptation 
measures. Known as ‘frame pluralism’, instances where multiple frames coexist can hinder agreement and 
make responsive action near impossible (Laws & Rein, 2003). However, frames are subject to change when 
the definition of a problem or social factors change, or when a breakdown leads to uncertainty in a given 
frame (Laws & Rein, 2003). Such a breakdown leads to an opening in perception with which the human 
mind works to restore order through reframing. When there is persistent unease in the status quo, either due 
to inherent uncertainty or due to continuous disturbance by involved stakeholders, it prompts cycles of 
redefinition and reframing (Laws & Rein, 2003). ‘Reframing’ is not a process that can be strategically 
 
16 Opposite to ‘episodic framing’ is ‘thematic framing’ which incorporates broader, situational aspects into the framing 
discourse on an issue (Crow & Lawler, 2016). 
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planned out; it tends to be organic and is oftentimes only recognisable in hindsight, growing out of an 
enduring series of problems of contestation, discontent and uncertainty (Laws & Rein, 2003).17  
 
According to Neto (2016) revising or redeveloping water policy is a necessary starting point in order to 
move away from the technical-response trend, in order to include more complex or nuanced factors and 
impacts. Vogel and Olivier (2018) discuss how the drought of the 1990s in South Africa led to the formation 
of a national Drought Forum which was an inclusive structure with the intention of bringing multiple 
stakeholders and experts together to develop a strategy for drought governance and risk reduction for the 
diverse range of people affected by drought. While this transdisciplinary forum is considered to have had 
an instrumental and effective role in the drought then, over time it was dissolved as the drought subsided. 
It was, after all, put in place as a response to a crisis and was therefore treated as temporary. This is 
unfortunate as it leaves the predominant approach to drought crises susceptible to shifting back to a 
narrower framing (Vogel & Olivier, 2018).  
 
Essentially, the theory of framing suggests that phenomena are presented through a particular lens to 
promote a particular position. Framing affects how information is interpreted to make sense of experiences. 
It can influence an audience regarding what to think, how to think and by extension, how to act in relation 
to a particular issue. In this way, the process of framing is inherent in the formation and publication of 
public communications. Framing can be viewed both positively or negatively, it can be manipulative and 
deceiving, or it can be viewed in more neutral terms where it can prompt a learning process whereby 
common beliefs and social norms are acquired (Chong & Druckman, 2007). When it comes to sustainable 
resource management, it is necessary for governments to be aware of how they interpret and present their 
messages, how they position themselves and the public, and how they frame situations, solutions and 
responsibility. There is a need to communicate with the public in a way that not only informs but also 
supports responsible behaviour amongst citizens as a central aspect of sustainable resource management. 
While urban water crisis management is not a reliable long-term solution especially given the likelihood of 
changing weather trends due to climate change, reactive emergency responses to drought in times of crisis 
have proven to be effective short-term solutions to water shortage in many parts of the world (Buurman, 
Mens & Dahm, 2017). Frames studies are important because they shed light on seemingly neutral 
information, which can have underlying agendas and influence. They offer insight into past experiences 
including failures and successes, which may be helpful to improve future responses and climate resilience.  
 
17 In addition to ‘reframing’, opinions can be swayed by small changes in the way an issue is framed and presented; 
known as ‘framing effects’, seemingly minor alterations in the presentation of an issue or an event are able to produce 
major changes in opinion (Chong & Druckman, 2007).  
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2.4 Urban water management 
Before delving into water crisis management, it is necessary to understand water management generally. 
According to the system in place for the CCT (and many other urban metropolitan areas around the world), 
water as a resource is provided to residents by the City as the managing authority (Ziervogel, 2019). The 
public take a largely passive, consumer role, and it is the responsibility of the City to ensure water quality 
and access for the public. Urban water management is an integral component of this system; it refers to the 
decisions, actions and strategies regarding access, quality and quantity of water by a municipality taking 
into account the needs and perspectives of all stakeholders and users within a municipal area (Neto, 2016). 
In South Africa, there is a strong focus on ensuring water access for all citizens, which is reflected in policy 
with tariffs that aim to be as cheap as possible to ensure access for poorer households (Neto, 2016). 
According to Neto (2016), investigating the relationship between water, consumers and managing 
authorities, helps to better understand the social, political and biophysical dynamics. It also offers potential 
for improved relations between the public and government, and better resource management generally. 
 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the triadic relationship between resource (water), consumer (private households 
and individual residents)18 and managing authority (CCT). Through informational communications, tariff 
increases, punitive measures and incentive programmes the resource managing authority can influence the 
consumption demand of consumers (Turner et al., 2016). These relations can be strategically managed 
through communication of information and coercive messaging. However, the resource availability is not 
fixed; the situation is always shifting and as such, communications management needs to adapt and innovate 
accordingly (Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016). This suggests that information and communications, such as the 
City’s water crisis response campaign, are an ongoing and critical component of urban water management.  
 
Figure 2.1: Diagram illustrating the triadic relationships between 
resource, consumer and water management (source: author) 
 
18 This study focuses on private households and individual resident consumers; however, it is important to note that 
there are other categories of consumers within the city such as commercial and industrial businesses, public entities 
and public institutions (such as hospitals). 
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2.5  Water crisis management 
A crisis is defined as a situation presenting difficult and or potentially dangerous circumstances (Naik, 
2017). Usually, a crisis occurs when an extreme situation is being recognised and there is a breaking point 
which signifies a moment of change from usual conditions. Water crises includes drought, floods, 
infrastructural damage and changes in the physical accessibility of water which threatens daily life. 
Generally, a water crisis develops when there is a deviation from normal water cycle conditions,19 causing 
a breakdown in the government's ability to ensure sufficient access to safe water for the public. Since this 
project focuses on a water shortage in Cape Town, it draws on drought management literature in particular. 
A drought is a period of time with pronounced spells of less than average rainfall for a certain area (Head, 
2014). A drought becomes a water shortage crisis when it threatens daily human functioning and when it 
becomes necessary for the water management body to implement intervention measures (Naik, 2017).  
 
Water crisis management refers to the responses, solutions and recommendations put forward by a water 
management authority in attempts to minimise negative impacts during a water crisis (Head, 2014). Despite 
the threat of water crises around the world, drought management is largely reactive, symptom-orientated 
and crisis-centred (Wilhite et al., 2014). Water shortage management solutions and responses, on the other 
hand, include both long-term and short-term solutions, with demand-side or supply-side objectives. Efforts 
might include technical solutions such as desalination, wastewater treatment schemes, and constructing new 
dams (Head, 2014; Buurman et al., 2017). However, technical responses tend to be expensive and require 
months if not years to develop and implement. In times of acute and urgent shortage, it can be more cost-
effective to catalyse demand-side management options such as implementing restrictions, increasing tariffs, 
reducing pressure in supply pipes and investing in information sharing in order to communicate the crisis 
with the public and encourage consumption reduction (Turner et al., 2016).  
 
Water restrictions can be an effective short-term solution to balance the supply and demand of water in 
times of acute water shortage (Dolnicar et al., 2012). Nevertheless, policy and planning for drought 
preparedness and mitigation is necessary for future resilience. While many parts of the world have been 
affected in some way by drought in the last two decades, a recent drought in Australia is particularly 
interesting in that it has many similarities to the Cape Town drought. In what became known as the 
Millennium drought, Australia experienced a persistent drought between 1997 and 2012 which affected 
most of the country. In 2008, the government introduced the Target 140 [T140] and Target 155 [T155] 
 
19 However, other management issues including infrastructural deficits and financial mismanagement may exacerbate 




campaigns in Queensland and Melbourne respectively. Much like the Day Zero campaign, T140 and T155 
aimed to encourage residents to limit their water consumption to 140 litres (Queensland) and 155 litres 
(Melbourne) per person per day (Turner et al., 2016). While the government invested in supply options, 
demand-side measures were found to be more effective and required less input as well as less resources 
than supply options (Turner et al., 2016).  
 
There is not much mention in research about what was unsuccessful in the Millennium drought response, 
rather the focus is on the successful aspects of the campaign. One factor associated with the success of the 
T140 and T155 campaigns, and suggested for other water saving campaigns, is to consider supply-side as 
well as demand-side management measures (Turner et al., 2016). Strong demand-side communication 
programmes that target different levels and sectors of water users (including individual, household, business 
and industry) and supply-side options that are innovative, diverse and scalable are recommended (Turner 
et al., 2016). Implementing innovative pricing mechanisms are necessary as they not only work to 
encourage water saving but also to generate revenue for the supply-side infrastructure development (Turner 
et al., 2016). In Australia, water prices were increased during the drought and an additional 5% 
‘environmental levy’ was charged to water users (Grant et al., 2013). The price increase highlighted the 
severity of the situation, discouraged wastefulness and helped to cover the expenses of installing 
augmentation infrastructure.  
 
Another important aspect put forward for drought management is to have open and understandable 
communication between the governing body and the public about the state of the drought and the response 
measures being utilised; reliable data and ongoing monitoring methods are necessary to ensure open and 
relevant communications (Turner et al., 2016). In Australia, municipal authorities implemented 
communication strategies in attempt to bring down consumption levels, with dedicated mail deliveries, 
informative websites and media advertising (Turner et al., 2016). Residents were strongly encouraged to 
adhere to a voluntary target of 150 litres total water use per person per day. Residents were urged to take 
short showers (no longer than three minutes), and to collect rainwater and grey water for flushing and 
irrigation. Authorities also introduced WaterMAP as a means to manage major water users by requiring 
mandatory annual reports and in-house water conservation plans (Grant et al., 2013). Water authorities also 
assisted commercial and industrial water users to develop water reduction plans (Grant et al., 2013). In 
addition, targets were set by water management; the state of Victoria set a target to reuse 20% of all 
wastewater inflows to be harvested and directed to treatment plants. This target was exceeded (24% in 
2010) but was only possible when coupled with responsible regulations regarding water quality and careful 
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management on a continuous basis (Grant et al., 2013). Overall, the focus was on education, behaviour 
change and valuing water as a collective good rather than pushing punitive measures (Turner et al., 2016). 
2.6  Demand-side urban water management and public communications 
The need to communicate with the public in order to facilitate water reduction behaviour changes has 
proven to be highly useful for managing a water shortage effectively. According to Dziegielewski, (1991) 
a successful campaign includes a message conveying the seriousness of the drought and the effects likely 
to occur without behaviour change. It also has a social reinforcement element that encourages conservation-
behaviour amongst community groups and a confirmation of how consumers reduction efforts will help in 
mitigating the water shortage (Dziegielewski, 1991). This includes carefully determined and reasonable 
requested changes that are conceivable and achievable for consumers, and offer a sense that the requested 
efforts are fair and necessary (Dziegielewski, 1991). Lastly, incentive strategies and feedback opportunities 
are suggested for residents to see the results of their efforts (Dziegielewski, 1991). 
 
The factors mentioned above were all incorporated into the T140 and T155 campaign in some form. The 
communications campaigns composed of mass media messages and imagery in the form of posters, 
information booklets and fact sheets, a website for information, and direct mail delivery of fridge magnets 
and four-minute shower timers (Turner et al., 2016). Information regarding water storage levels, weekly 
rainfall and suggested water saving methods were regularly communicated to residents on all major 
broadcasting platforms including television, radio, newspapers and billboards (Grant et al., 2013).  
 
While Dziegielewski’s (1991) suggestions are important, campaigns normally consist of multiple strategies 
and these strategies do not function in isolation but work in various combinations in reaching an audience 
(Liang et al., 2018). This is to say that the role of framing for effective water conservation campaigns and 
water crisis management generally is not a simple equation. However, it is worth noting that messages 
based on loss are heavily utilised in times of crisis. Liang et al., (2018) found that when people perceive a 
situation as having high risks, they are more accepting of and willing to adopt alternative water consumption 
behaviours. Messages based on potential losses are more effective than messages about potential gains as 
losses seem to evoke stronger responses than gain messages (Liang et al., 2018). It is also worth noting that 
increased awareness of perceived risk (usually via first-hand experience) can lead to critical pro-
environmental behaviour changes. This was observed in an area experiencing drought in the state of 
California, USA, where an overall target of 25% water demand reduction was set with different targets for 
each water district (Palazo et al., 2019). Research found that the more severe the drought was in a particular 
area, the more likely that area was to achieve the set goal (Palazo et al., 2019). This confirms the notion 
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that communications campaigns play an important role in delivering vital information to residents who are 
required to reduce their demand in order to minimise the severity of the water shortage. 
2.7  Conclusion 
The first part of this chapter looked at framing theory, which asserts that there are multiple ways to view 
and understand an issue; known as frames, these viewpoints determine how types of information and events 
are presented and perceived. Framing theory is particularly relevant to media and communications studies, 
where the framing of phenomena affects the interpretation thereof. Furthermore, framing not only affects 
how a situation is perceived, but also what course of action is taken in response. Therefore, frames studies 
can be useful to offer insights into dominant frames, shifts over time and different trends of framing by 
different groups on the same issue. 
 
The second part of this chapter looked at urban water management, which essentially deals with the triadic 
relationship between management authorities, the public as consumers and water as a resource, and includes 
all decisions, actions and strategies taken by water management authorities to handle access, quality and 
quantity of water to the public. Communication is a critical component of resource management as it helps 
to deliver messages, recommendations and any restrictions to the public. This is particularly pertinent 
during times of heightened risk, as is the case when a water shortage becomes a water crisis because it 
escalates to pose potential danger to society. Water crisis management refers to the measures put in place 
by the management authority to reduce the risk of negative impacts, and may include short-term or long-
term methods targeting a reduction in consumption levels, technical solutions and other measures that could 
offer relief. Once again, communications is an effective mechanism for managing a water crisis and 
studying its role in urban water management offers potential to identify effective methods and improve 
overall management.  
 
The recommendations from research on recent water crises, such as the Millennium drought in Australia, 
indicate the importance of studying real life examples of drought framing for improving future responses 
and planning by governments around the world. The CCT’s water crisis response campaign aimed to 
drastically reduce water consumption levels amongst residents of Cape Town when the water supply was 
uncertain. Analysing communication campaigns such as the City’s water crisis response, may offer insight 
into the potential of communications to improve resource management overall. Hence the concept of 
framing is selected here as a theoretical framework that can detect underpinning understandings in drought 
communication messages. This is especially pertinent given the increased likelihood of variating weather 








This chapter provides a brief overview of the context of Cape Town’s water crisis between March 2017 and 
March 2018 and the crisis-response actions undertaken by the City. It covers Cape Town’s geography, 
economy, population, range of water users, climate, hydrological state and water storage system. The City 
of Cape Town’s municipal region and approach to water management is also discussed as well as the lead 
up to the water crisis.20 The full story is dense and complex and has therefore been summarised here. The 
chapter provides the contextual factors that provide a background to understand the Cape Town water crisis. 
 
The chapter begins by covering some of the broader factors relating to Cape Town and water in section 3.2, 
including the climate, hydrology and geography of the Cape Town region. It then moves on to section 3.3 
which deals with water management in the City of Cape Town. Section 3.4 focuses on the events in the 
lead up to the crisis and the progression from drought to water crisis in Cape Town. Section 3.5 discusses 
other actors besides the City, and section 3.6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2 Climate, hydrology and geography of Cape Town  
Known for its natural beauty, Cape Town is a metropolitan city situated at the south western peninsula of 
Africa. The city is a popular tourist destination as well as one of South Africa’s regional capital cities and 
economic hubs with a busy shipping port (Ziervogel, 2019). The City of Cape Town is the municipal body 
responsible for 2 446.4 square kilometres of the Western Cape region [see figure 3.1] (Municipalities of 
South Africa, 2019). The estimated population for Cape Town is 4 005 015 people; of which 17,6% are 
reported as living in informal housing without built-in water infrastructure (Wazimap, 2019). Residents in 
formal housing consume an estimated 66% of water while informal settlements consume as little as 4% of 
the water supplied by the CCT (Ziervogel, 2019).  
 
 
20 For a comprehensive overview see Gina Ziervogel’s Unpacking the Cape Town Drought: Lessons Learned. Report 




Figure 3.1: Map of the City of Cape Town’s municipal region (Source: Municipalities of South Africa, 2019, 
https://municipalities.co.za/overview/6/city-of-cape-town-metropolitan-municipality) 
 
The region experiences a Mediterranean climate with warm, dry summer months and cool, wet winter 
months. The majority of rainfall occurs during the winter season between May and October (Wolski, 2018). 
In the past, the region received an annual average rainfall varying between 400mm in the more arid west 
coast, and 2 000mm in the mountain regions (Wolski, 2018). In the winters of 2015, 2016 and 2017 rainfall 
dropped between 30% and 50% below average, causing a hydrological drought in the region (Wolski, 
2018). 
 
Cape Town relies on water from supply dams in outlying areas. Known as the Big Six, the Theewaterskloof, 
Voëlvlei, Berg River, Wemmershoek, Upper Steenbras and Lower Steenbras dams account for over 99% 
of the total storage of water in the Western Cape Water Supply System [WCWSS] which supplies the City 
[see figure 3.2] (Ziervogel, 2019; DWS, 2019). The water system has a total capacity of around 900 000 
million litres, a number that has been reached frequently in the past; in fact, in the season before the onset 
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of the drought, 2014, the system reached 100% capacity and the rainy season finished near full with a total 
of 885 441 million litres in storage (Wolski, 2018; CSAG 2019). However, the WCWSS saw significant 
drops between 2015 and 2017 as a result of the ‘dry’ winters, going from an overall total of 655 134 million 
litres in 2015 to 344 657 million litres in 2017 [see figure 3.3] (CSAG, 2019).21 The WCWSS supplies not 
only the City of Cape Town but other municipal and agricultural areas in the region as well (Ziervogel, 
2019). Consequently, multiple municipalities were affected by the water shortage in the Western Cape. 
However, as the user with the highest demand, the CCT had the biggest pressure to respond (DWS, 2019).  
 




21 Measurements are recorded on November 1st each year, which marks the beginning of the hydrological year and 
the end of the rainy season, when the dams are technically at their fullest for the year (Ziervogel, 2019).  
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Figure 3.3: Graph showing the dam storage levels for the Western Cape Water Supply System from 2008 to 
2019 (source: csag, 2019, http://cip.csag.uct.ac.za/monitoring/bigsix.html) 
 
3.3 Water management in the City of Cape Town 
In South Africa, water is recognised as a common good and is co-managed across different levels of 
government, with local governments largely responsible for the logistical management of day-to-day supply 
(City of Cape Town, 2019b). Within the CCT, the Water and Sanitation Department [WSD] is responsible 
for managing water. The department oversees city supply, catchment management, quality control, meter 
reading, waste management, stormwater management, pollution prevention, treatment schemes, and 
augmentation plans (City of Cape Town, 2019b). In addition, the department includes the Water Demand 
Management and Strategy Branch, which handles demand-side management. Furthermore, the department 
is involved in the collaborative management of the WCWSS as it is a complex system which requires 
cooperation between different levels of government and multiple municipalities, with some dams belonging 
to the CCT and others to the national Department of Water and Sanitation [DWS] (DWS, 2019).  
 
Before the water crisis, the CCT supplied around 900 megalitres of water to city residents and businesses 
each day (City of Cape Town, 2019b). The WCWSS seemed relatively stable with models indicating the 
system’s supply to be at a level of 98% assurance for urban users and 95% assurance for agriculture for any 
given year (Ziervogel, 2019). Given the high levels of assurance and the unlikeliness of three years of 
persistently low rainfall, there were no contingency plans for a crisis of this severity. However, at the first 
warning signs of a shortage in 2015, Disaster Management within the CCT and the Western Cape Provincial 
Government (referred to as the Province) conducted assessments. Realising the risks, Province requested 
that National Disaster Risk Management declare a disaster in the Province (Ziervogel, 2019). However, this 
request was unmet and the situation treated as not-yet -urgent. It was not until March 3rd, 2017 that Cape 
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Town was declared a disaster area22 and noticeable restrictions came into effect for the Cape Town public 
(Robins, 2019).  
 
In response to the urgency of the water shortage in 2015 and 2016, water-saving measures that were 
implemented by the City included increased tariffs, reduced water pressure, investment in desalination and 
groundwater extraction, and incremental levels of stringent restrictions for individuals, households, 
business and agriculture (Ziervogel, 2018).23 In addition, the City established the Water Resilience Task 
Team [WRTT] in May 2017, who were tasked with devising a Water Resilience Plan based on various 
scenarios with the aim of planning the objectives and logistics of water supply, particularly if the ‘new 
normal’ low levels of rainfall were to persist in 2017 (Robins, 2019).  
 
As the crisis peaked in October 2017, the Mayor began daily meetings with various key players in order to 
monitor the precarious situation. Around this time, communications and demand-management 
responsibilities were shifted from the internal department in the WSD to a high-level task team chaired by 
the Mayor (Ziervogel, 2019). This task team included an external communications firm called Resolve, 
who were involved in the communications released to the public. Informing and encouraging the public to 
reduce demand was crucial to preserve the small amount of water that was available in the system. With 
the influence of Resolve, the CCT initiated the Day Zero campaign in the last quarter of 2017. Day Zero 
was a term that referred to a future date where the taps would be cut off.24 The campaign aimed to prompt 
significant reductions in water consumption amongst the residents of Cape Town through multiple 
communications platforms and utilising a variety of techniques and strategies to communicate the drought 
severity, restrictions, allowances and suggested reduction measures (Ziervogel, 2019). This task team was 
the driving force behind the City’s drought response campaign. The City’s approach has been criticized for 
being too fear-provoking, however there was a reduction of water consumption making it successful albeit 
contentious (Robins, 2019). The winter of 2018 brought sufficient rainfall to replenish the supply dams, 
which lifted the persistent drought, and in March 2018, Day Zero was officially ‘delayed’ to 2019 or later 
(Robins, 2019).25 In October 2018, restrictions were dropped to level 5 and in December further dropped 
 
22 Following the local disaster announcement, a provincial disaster was declared in the Western Cape Province on 
May 23rd, 2017; and a national disaster declared only on February 13th, 2018 (Ziervogel, 2019). 
23 More controversial methods included the green dot map and the release of a list of the roads where the highest 100 
consumers resided (Robins, 2019; Ziervogel, 2019). 
24 Day Zero is a term that was closely related to the Cape Town drought. It first began being used in early 2017 on 
electronic message boards along the freeways to communicate to the public the projected days until water supply 
would cut off (Ziervogel, 2019).  
25 The City states that the Day Zero was averted and the crisis period is over, however there is still the ongoing 
challenge of access to adequate amounts of quality water and sanitation in Cape Town’s 204 informal settlements, 
many of which have been subjected to Day Zero conditions for years. While the crisis may be over in terms of water 
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to level 3, offering a sense of relief for the residents of Cape Town (Western Cape Government, 2019). As 
a result of the crisis, a comprehensive water strategy draft is being developed for the City of Cape Town, 
should a similar crisis arise in the near future (Ziervogel, 2019).26 Table 3.1 lists some of the important 
events leading up to the water crisis. 
 
Table 3.1: Brief timeline of events of the Cape Town water crisis (adapted from Ziervogel, 2019, and CSAG, 
2019) 
November 2014: WCWSS closes rainy season with 885 441 million litres in supply 
November 2015:  WCWSS closes rainy season with 655 134 million litres in supply 
November 2015:  
Provincial Disaster Management requests National Disaster Risk Management to declare 
national disaster status 
November 2016:  WCWSS closes rainy season with 550 953 million litres in supply 
March 2017:  Cape Town is declared a local disaster area by the Mayor 
May 2017:  The term Day Zero begins to be used 
June 2017:  Level 4 water restrictions implemented 
September 2017:  Level 5 water restrictions implemented 
October 2017:  Mayor assembles special task team and daily meetings commence 
October 2017:  WCWSS closes rainy season with 344 657 million litres in supply 
November 2017:  The term Day Zero is officially adopted for water crisis 
January 2018:  Level 6 water restrictions implemented 
February 2018:  Drought declared National disaster affecting three provinces 
March 2018:  Day Zero is delayed to 2018 
May 2018:  Day Zero is delayed beyond 2019 
October 2018:  Restrictions drop to Level 5 
November 2018:  WCWSS closes rainy season with 671 500 million litres in supply 
December 2018:  Restrictions drop to Level 3 
 
available, political ecologists would argue that the urgency with which the ‘crisis’ was addressed by the City, was 
reserved for the upper-middle class, which indicates an inequitable view of the poor by the CCT. 
26 According to the draft, future approaches to water crisis include clear communication strategies to communicate to 
urban residents the worth of water, future climate effects and the importance of planning for extreme weather events 
(City of Cape Town, 2019a). Existing as well as potentially effective new channels of communication will be explored 





In 2017, the then Mayor of Cape Town, Patricia De Lille, co-authored a book titled, View From City Hall: 
Reflections on governing Cape Town. The book dealt with the CCT’s approach to managing the ever-
expanding city and the complexities associated therewith (De Lille & Kesson, 2017). Considering the book 
was released just prior to the Day Zero crisis period, it has relatively little content related to a water shortage 
crisis. The authors acknowledged the drought, how it challenged the effectiveness of the City’s long-
standing water system and suggested the need for future augmentation. De Lille & Kesson, (2017) note the 
existence of water-conservation and water-demand management plans but do not unpack future planning 
for drought resilience in detail. Instead the focus is placed on responsible participation from residents. The 
authors note an apathy and a lack of cooperation of some high-user residents, which they believe hinders 
the effectiveness of demand-side management (De Lille & Kesson, 2017). According to the perspective of 
the City at that time, they managed the system well but their responses to drought were limited (De Lille & 
Kesson, 2017). Public communications was highlighted as a critical aspect of water reduction, along with 
increased water charges and reduced pressure in the system (De Lille & Kesson, 2017).  
3.4  From drought to water crisis 
The drought was a natural phenomenon that occurred due to below average rainfall (Wolski, 2018). The 
matter was exacerbated by three years of back-to-back below average rainfall. The drought became a water 
shortage crisis when the City recognised that the WCWSS could no longer supply normal demand. Through 
the operationalisation and implementation of multiple water-saving measures, the City was able to reduce 
water consumption to supply around 510 megalitres a day – 43% less than before the crisis (City of Cape 
Town, 2019b). The recent water crisis was the worst in Cape Town’s recorded history dating back to the 
1880s (Wolski, 2018). While other periods of drought have occurred, the severity of the most recent water 
crisis is unprecedented and yet despite being unlikely, it did occur, highlighting the need for contingency 
planning and public engagement. 
 
One of the primary factors involved in the lead up to the crisis was the three consecutive hydrological ‘dry’ 
years which did not replenish the supply dams enough to meet the demands of WCWSS users (Wolski, 
2018). Another factor was the City’s slow response time due to the imperceptible threat in 2015 and 2016 
when the WCWSS could still meet demand and the general assumption was that the winter of 2017 would 
deliver normal average rainfall, which it did not (Wolski, 2018). Despite the fact that Cape Town is an arid 
region, a water shortage of this severity had never been experienced, so when 2017 proved to be another 
‘dry’ year, it became clear that there was not a contingency plan for such a crisis as it had never been needed 
before (Ziervogel, 2019). Further factors include the fact that high water users were accustomed to easy 
access and concerns for moderation were minimal.  
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3.5 Other actors 
Up to this point, this chapter has focused on the scientific facts of the drought and the sequence of events 
by the City as they attempted to manage the water shortage. While the role of the City is central to this 
study, the CCT is not an isolated institution and there are other actors worth noting – both state and non-
state actors. The Department of Water and Sanitation at national level works with provincial government27 
to manage water (DWS, 2019). Their responsibilities focus on policy formulation and implementation, 
release of dam water and implementing restrictions where necessary (Ziervogel, 2019). The logistical 
management of day-to-day water supply is the responsibility of local governments based on 
national/provincial allowances, hence the active role of the CCT during the water crisis (City of Cape Town, 
2019b).  
 
It is also worth noting the existence of minor actors such as residence associations, social coalitions and 
activist groups, who banded together to form community campaigns in the spirit of the Day Zero crisis and 
also expressed concerns and criticism regarding the City’s management of the situation (Robins, 2019). It 
is possible that communities were more willing to trust these smaller actor groups, however the extent to 
which they influenced the public in comparison to the City is not dealt with in this study. Nevertheless, the 
City was instrumental in setting up the dominant frames of the problem, how it was understood and what 
solutions were put forward. In this way understanding the backstory of the water crisis in Cape Town in 
2017/2018, is to understand how the City exerted its power in rendering the framing of the crisis.  
3.6 Conclusion 
Cape Town is a large metropolis located in an arid region at the southern tip of Africa, which experienced 
a highly unlikely hydrological drought between 2015 and 2017. Overall, it is considered that the City 
underestimated the severity of the water shortage. While they were aware of the drought and the need to 
prepare for water shortage in future infrastructure planning, it was still considered to be under control. The 
drought became a water crisis for Cape Town’s four million residents when it became clear that the 
municipality was unable to ensure supply. Amongst other mechanisms and undertakings, the City appealed 
to the public to reduce consumption in order to minimise the likelihood of reaching Day Zero. The threat 
of dry taps moved many to action, drastically reducing water demand in the city and delaying the 
actualisation of Day Zero until rainfall in 2018 replenished supply dams. Going forward, it is likely that 
climate change and anthropocentric drivers will exacerbate the likelihood of disrupted weather patterns and 
the occurrence of extreme climate events such as the three-year drought in Cape Town (Otto et al., 2018). 
 
27 There is no specific department of water in the provincial government of the Western Cape. 
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While there is a need for better planning and more resilient infrastructure, the reduction in consumption in 
Cape Town, illustrates how a city can conserve massive amounts of water when it is necessary. It was in 
this context that the City relied heavily on communications with the public to convey messages about the 
state of water available, restrictions being implemented, the City’s efforts to mitigate the situation, and to 









This project focused on items released to the public and made available online which intended to inform 
them of the state of the drought and how to save water, as well as to communicate the position of the CCT 
vis-à-vis the crisis by the executive mayor and the City. Items were collected and sorted and an abductive 
approach (Dubois & Gadde, 2002, Soiferman, 2010, Eriksson, 2012) was taken to develop a coding 
mechanism and to analyse data simultaneously. Data was recorded onto excel spreadsheets, which were 
then used to analyse trends in the City’s framing of the water crisis and whether the City’s framing shifted 
throughout the response period.  
 
This chapter is divided into four main sections: data collection, sampling, analysis and limitations of the 
study. Section 4.2, data collection, consists of details relating to how the data was sourced. Section 4.3 is 
the sampling section, which explains the criteria for data included in the study. Section 4.4 is the analysis 
section, which describes how the data was processed and coded, and lastly, section 4.5 is the limitations 
and challenges section, which notes some of the shortcomings and restrictions of the project. 
4.2 Data collection 
Data consisted of primary documentary material produced and released by the CCT during the water crisis 
(03/2017 – 03/2018). Items of data were accessed via the water-related pages from the City's website 
including the water saving toolkits (https://www.capetown.gov.za/Family%20and%20home/Education-
and-research-materials/Graphics-and-educational-material/water-saving-resources), the water dashboard 
(https://coct.co/water-dashboard/),  ThinkWater (https://coct.co/thinkwater/), and the water and sanitation 
education resources (https://www.capetown.gov.za/Family%20and%20home/Education-and-research-
materials/Graphics-and-educational-material/Water-education-resources). Data was comprised of official 
communications released by the executive mayor and the City in the form of speeches, press releases, public 
summaries, and educational materials which consisted of items that offered drought information and water-
saving instructions to the public in the form of posters, photographs, information guides, infographics and 
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a newsletter. All items were released by the CCT during the crisis period (03/2017 – 03/2018) and all were 
made available online.  
4.3 Sampling 
The data set consisted of items released between March 2017 and March 2018. These temporal bounds 
were based on the date the mayor declared Cape Town to be a local disaster area (3/3/2017), and the date 
it was announced that the crisis (i.e. Day Zero) was officially deferred to 2019 or beyond (19/3/2017) 
(Ziervogel, 2019). The hydrological drought began in 2015, however the disaster status was only declared 
in March of 2017, and it was not until October of 2017 when Day Zero was announced, that the crisis 
peaked (Ziervogel, 2019). This peak is reflected in the significant spike in Google hits for the term “Cape 
Town Drought” as depicted in figure 4.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Google Trends results for the term “Cape Town drought” between April 2014 and April 2019 
(source: Google Trends, 25 April 2019) 
 
This project focused on English communications, as this was the City’s primary language of communication 
during the water crisis. It is worth noting however that the City released multiple versions of some items – 
particularly educational items – in the three main languages of the region, namely English, isiXhosa and 
Afrikaans. All items were produced and released by the CCT. Items included in the analysis consisted of 
speeches, press releases, public summaries, posters, pamphlets, photographs, presentations, information 
guides, infographics and a newsletter.28 Table 4.1 outlines the types of items included in the sample. The 
prerequisite terms included in the communications in order to qualify for analysis in this project were “water 
 
28 Items including reports, punitive measures, resource strategies, policies and by-laws were not included in the 
sample as these items do not communicate directly with the public. 
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shortage”, “water crisis”, “drought” or “Day Zero”, with the exception of photographs, which do not contain 
text but nonetheless were intended to communicate a message relating to the water shortage.29 
 
Table 4.1: Types of items sampled 
Type of communication Explanation of item types 
Speeches  Speeches by the executive mayor containing information relating to the water-shortage. 
Press releases  Press releases mostly in the form of statements by the executive mayor or her team. 
Public summaries  
Public summaries containing details and information about a particular aspect relating 
to the water-shortage according to the City and intended for the public. 
Posters  
Posters that were scalable and intended to be displayed at strategic points with high foot 
traffic or where water behaviour physically occurred (e.g. near bathrooms).  
Pamphlets  Pamphlets promoting water-use reduction, intended for mass copy and circulation. 
Photographs  Photographs relating to the water shortage, including with and without text overlays.  
Presentations  
Presentations in the form of PowerPoints, with information and visuals related to the 
water-shortage. 
Information guides  
Information guides with dense text to explain a specific water-saving measure’s 
recommended processes and risks to avoid. 
Infographics  A visual-based poster depicting simplified details or a flow of information. 
Newsletters  
A newsletter by the CCT containing information and short articles about the drought, 
promoting the need to conserve, and ways to reduce water use. 
 
4.4 Analysis 
This project uses an abductive approach to reveal the set of frames used by the City. Where deductive 
reasoning applies general rules to derive specific conclusions, and inductive reasoning draws from specific 
observations to produce wider generalisations (Soiferman, 2010), abduction offers an alternative to using 
either a deductive or inductive approach exclusively. Abductive reasoning is not simply a mix of deductive 
and inductive approaches, however it does combine aspects of the two approaches and seeks to draw 
conclusions about the cause-and-effect of the event under study (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Abduction draws 
on empirical observation to produce the simplest or most likely explanation of phenomena. Abduction 
opens up space for the discovery of other variables and complex nuances which help to explain the events 
 
29 Some photographs were released as part of ThinkWater, an initiative established during the drought by the City to 
communicate ongoing information about the state of water supply in Cape Town and water-saving behaviour. It is 
ongoing at the time of writing. 
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under observation and brings together previous ideas with the current event under study, drawing on 
prevailing knowledge to lay the groundwork and then engaging with the data itself to cross-analyse 
possibilities (Dubois & Gadde, 2002; Eriksson, 2012). This was an ideal approach as it allows for the 
influence of past research to shape and guide the study, while allowing for frames to be identified 




Figure 4.2: Process of abductive approach adapted for this study (source: author) 
 
The water crisis in Cape Town was not an isolated event, nor were the CCT’s communication items released 
entirely randomly. There was a context which shaped the need for, and nature of the communication items 
put out to the public. For this reason, it is useful to make use of past research and experience which may 
prompt questioning and comparisons about the current event under analysis (Eriksson, 2012). From the 
outset, the main aspects which were deductively flagged as potentially important were the nature of the 
crisis, the nature of the problems, the suggested solutions, and the allocation of responsibility put forward 
in the communications. Framing is by nature situation-specific and therefore each study requires a 
knowledge of the context. However, while there were broader factors to consider, there were also factors 
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and nuances that are unique to the CCT’s communications, which could only be identified inductively 
during analysis. It is important to note that inductive reasoning works on the premise that frames are not 
necessarily explicit but also implied via clues such as metaphors, imagery, word associations and other 
elements, all of which are known as devices or reasoning devices (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). The researcher 
then draws associations between these elements in order to make meaningful associations amongst the 
data.30 
 
While there was a heavy reliance on inductive reasoning to identify frames, the abductive approach ensured 
that the subject of study was not analysed without considering the broader literature on drought crises which 
offered valuable insight and grounding for the study. Similarly, the abductive approach works against the 
main shortfall of a purely deductive study which is the exclusion of critical information simply due to the 
fact that it was not detected and defined prior to analysis (Ardèvol-Abreu, 2015). As with inductive 
reasoning, an abductive approach cannot offer certain truths, but unlike inductive reasoning it does not seek 
to make broad generalisations. Abductive observations rather focus on finding the best explanation vis-à-
vis the state of a particular event, especially when observations are incomplete (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). 
Through this combined approach, potential patterns and trends could be observed, building up a tentative 
understanding of the City’s framing of the water crisis which could then be used to explore possible 
conclusions (Soiferman, 2010).  
 
The data was analysed manually using excel spreadsheets which facilitated more flexibility and allowed for 
the discovery of new or more nuanced frames to be identified throughout the analysis process than may 
have been observed using other computer programmes designed for qualitative analysis. An initial scoping 
analysis captured practical details such as medium, intended audience, blame and hero positioning, and 
relevant quotes or excerpts on a spreadsheet [see appendix I]. A second spreadsheet was created to capture 
any framing aspects that were identified in the data [see appendix II]. Data was then cross analysed to check 
and confirm framing aspects. Together, the information from these spreadsheets was analysed to deduce 
prevalent key frames amongst the data. Once the key frames were established, data was again analysed to 
recognise which key frames occurred in which items on a third spreadsheet [see appendix III]. As far as 
possible, each spreadsheet listed items according to date which helped to illustrate trends and shifts over 
time. 
 




4.5 Limitations and challenges 
Due to time constraints and the pre-set word limits of this thesis, this study is limited to communication 
items released by the CCT municipality during the drought period which specifically spoke to a public 
audience and which were made available online. Data sampled is therefore a subset of the total 
communication items released by the CCT during the crisis period. Communications regarding budgets, 
reports, punitive measures, resource strategies, policies and by-laws are not included. These 
communications are largely technical and serve to guide decisions at management level, and while they are 
important items, they do not target the public specifically, which is the focus of this research. Similarly, 
there were aspects of the campaign that targeted business and industry which were also important for the 
Cape Town water crisis but these are not dealt with in this project. There is potential for further research 
regarding framing in these items.  
 
Furthermore, there are perspectives and nuances from other stakeholders with other frames of the water 
crisis which are not considered in this research project. There were, for example, other Day Zero related 
campaigns launched by the Democratic Alliance (the political party in leadership in the City of Cape Town 
and the Western Cape government at the time of the drought) and independent groups, such as radio stations 
and internal drives at universities, schools, malls and businesses. There is therefore potential to also do 
further research in these areas. While this project offers a deeper understanding of how the CCT framed 
their position in relation to the crisis in their communications to the public and how this may have changed 
over time, the frames and stakeholder dynamics identified here are limited. The more complex back-and-
forth discourse and shifting frames associated therewith between multiple stakeholders and the City during 
the water crisis is also an area with future research potential. 
 
As there is no way to explain exactly how many people saw each communication item released by the City 
during that time and to what extent that item of communication was assimilated in the receivers’ minds, 
each piece of communication is assumed to have equal reach and influence, however it is probable that 
some items were more influential than others. Additionally, the sample dates were chosen based on the 
declaration and denouncement of a crisis period. It is possible that there are other notable trends preceding 
and following the crisis period, outside of the sample bounds, which may not be captured in this study. 
 
One of the challenges associated with this study is that it relied on the City’s website to collect data. The 
website is subject to updates, and as a result it is possible that there are some omissions of items that would 
otherwise have been eligible for inclusion in the sample but were not obtainable. Similarly, the City’s 
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document search tool also pulled up a handful of items with deadlinks that may have possibly been eligible 
for analysis but were not available.  
 
It is worth noting that in 2019, the CCT commenced a process of reflection in order to analyse their 
communications campaign during the water crisis response period. This is a relatively recent development 
and as such the nature, objectives and findings of this work are yet to be understood. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has covered the four main aspects of methods for this study, namely, data collection, sampling, 
analysis, and limitations and challenges. The data collection section explained how data was sourced via 
the CCT’s online document finders. This section also explained how the study focuses on particular 
communication items released by the City during the crisis period (03/2017 – 03/2018) which aimed to 
communicate the water shortage to the public and which were made available online. The sampling section 
explained how items were selected for inclusion, specifically types of items, language, terms included and 
the temporal bounds. The analysis sections explained how the data was processed and coded using an 
abductive approach which allowed for the inductive identification of framing aspects inherent in the data 







The framing of drought crisis communications by the CCT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the study. Utilising an abductive approach, the analysis provided 
multiple sets of information, including types of items of communication released, temporal spread of items, 
the identification of types of frames used by the CCT in the communications, and the frequency of those 
frame types. The findings aim to address the objectives of the research. The chapter is structured into five 
sections starting with the number and types of communication items in the data set dealt with in section 
5.2. Section 5.3 explains two main streams into which the data was divided. Section 5.4 deals with the 
analysis and development of a table of framing aspects. Section 5.5 describes the six main frames that 
emerged from the data, and lastly section 5.6 offers a timeline of the frequency of these frames occurring 
over the crisis period (03/2017 – 03/2018). 
5.2 Communication item types 
Based on the sampling criteria, 57 items qualified for analysis. In total, there were 10 types of 
communication items in the data set including speeches, statements, public summaries, posters, pamphlets, 
photographs, presentations, information guides, infographics and a newsletter.31 Figure 5.1 presents the 
number of different item types released during the crisis period (03/2017 – 03/2018) by percentage. The 
item type with the most releases during this time were statements made by the executive mayor and the 
City of Cape Town with 42.11%. Though far less, other types of communication items with moderately 
high numbers of releases include posters and photographs of which both had 12.28% respectively, and 
speeches with 10.53%.  
 




Figure 5.1: Various types of communication items presented by percentage 
5.3 Two streams of communication types 
During the initial stage of analysis, the investigation revealed that two distinct streams of communication 
types emerged from the data, namely the positioning/status stream and the instructional/educational stream. 
The positioning/status stream, referred to as stream A, consisted of official communications released by the 
executive mayor and the City which comprised of speeches, press releases and public summaries, which 
expressed the status of the crisis according to the City and positioned the roles of responsibility in managing 
the crisis. The instructional/educational stream, referred to as stream B, consisted of communication items 
which offered drought information and water-saving instructions to the public in the form of posters, 
photographs, information guides, infographics and a newsletter. In total, stream A comprised 33 items and 
stream B had 24 items [Table 5.1]. Table 5.1 shows the total number of items in each stream as a percentage 
of the entire data set. Stream A had more items with 58%, while stream B accounted for 42% of items 
[Table 5.1].  
 
 
Table 5.1: Total number of items in each stream 
Stream A: 33 (58%) Stream B: 24 (42%) Total items: 57 (100%) 
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5.4 The identification of framing aspects  
The second part of the analysis process consisted of identifying and noting all the characteristics, or aspects, 
of framing explicit or implicit in the data. These aspects were identified inductively through the analysis 
process and a total of 33 framing aspects were identified. The aspects of the frames were not mutually 
exclusive or binary. Table 5.2 shows all framing characteristics identified as well as words, symbols and 
imagery devices associated with each. For a breakdown of framing aspects identified in the data, see 
appendix II. 
 
Table 5.2: Framing aspects and associated devices 
 Framing aspect Description Devices (associated terms, metaphors, 
symbols or characteristics) 
Crisis status  Crisis The water shortage is framed a crisis “Day Zero”, “crisis”, “further decline”, 
“disaster”, needing saving 
Purpose of 
item 
Provide information The purpose of the communication is to 
provide information to the public 
Mention of dam supply levels, “improved 
public understanding”, explanation of 
CCT/mayor’s actions, 
educational/informational aids 
Persuasive/motivational The purpose of the communication is to 
persuade or motivate public participation 
Encouraging/motivational phrases 
Recommending The purpose of the communication is to 
recommend certain actions by the public 
Reference to reductions in outdoor water use 
Enforcing The purpose of the communication is to 
enforce restrictions on the public 
Tariff increase, water management devices 
Priority Environmental The main area of concern is framed as the 
environmental effects of the water crisis 
Reference to interventions in water 
catchment areas (e.g. removing alien 
vegetation); emphasis on low water levels in 
dams 
Social The main area of concern is framed as the 
social effects of the water crisis 
“Well-being”, “community”, “health and 
hygiene” 
Political The main area of concern is framed as the 
political effects of the water crisis 
Bureaucratic challenges (e.g. approval from 
national level) 
Economic The main area of concern is framed as the 
economic effects of the water crisis 
“Economy”, “costs”, “financial year”, 
“commerce” 
Cause Human activity induced The framing of the cause of the water 
crisis is ascribed to human activity 
“Save water while we have it”, “using too 
much”, positive reference to water 
reductions. reducing demand enhances 
supply in dams 
Natural occurrence The framing of the cause of the water 
crisis is ascribed to natural phenomena 
“Drought”, “reduced annual average 
rainfall”, lack of rain, lack of water in dams 
Problem 
rendering 
Technical issue The nature of the water crisis is framed as 
a technical problem 
“Boreholes”, “desalination”, “pressure 
management”, addressing infrastructure 
(leaks, etc.), technocratic and scientific 
language 
Consumption issue The nature of the water crisis is framed as 
a matter of excessive consumption 
“Demand management” 
Hydrological issue The nature of the water crisis is framed as 
a hydrological problem 
“Hot weather (summer)”, “further decline”, 
“drought”, “climate change” 
Temporal 
framing 
Long-term The temporal framing of the water crisis 
is long-term/permanent 
“Not going away”, “new normal”, “water 
“Security” 
Short-term The temporal framing of the water crisis A near end is implied, “navigate this period”, 
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is short-term/temporary “get through this together”, “immediate 
future” 
Reach  Pervasive The reach of the water crisis is framed as 
pervasive and city-wide or beyond 
Reference to Cape Town region, “all our 
futures” 
Isolated to certain areas The reach of the water crisis is framed as 
affecting isolated or certain areas 
“High-lying areas” 
Management  Under control The management of the water crisis is 
framed as under control by managing 
authority 
“We will not let a well-run city run out of 
water”, reference to mitigation measures 
coming into place 
Uncontrolled The management of the water crisis is 
framed as uncontrolled by managing 
authority 
Spikes in consumption, targets not met 
Controllable The management of the water crisis is 
framed as controllable by managing 
authority 
“Supply schemes', 'reduction programmes”, 
“restrictions”, “targets”, “save water while 
we have it” 
Responsibilit
y  
Responsibility of the 
government 
The effects of the water crisis are framed 
as the responsibility of government 
“Emergency schemes”, “augmentation”, 
“culture of water harvesting”, “proactive 
government” 
Responsibility of the 
public (personal) 
The effects of the water crisis are framed 
as the responsibility of the public 
Reference to consumption, reference to 
reduction measures, “save water while we 
have it” 
Understandin
g of effects 
Effects are understood The effects of the drought are framed as 
being known and understood 
 
Uncertainty about effects The effects of the drought are framed as 
being unknown or uncertain 




Wealthy will be/are 
affected 
The water crisis is framed to affect more 
affluent demographics 
 
Poor will be/are affected The water crisis is framed to affect poorer 
demographics 
“Most vulnerable residents of the city are 
least able to adapt to an escalating disaster” 
All demographics will 
be/are affected 
The water crisis is framed to affect all 
demographics 
“All our futures” 
Other aspects Moral issue requiring 
collective effort 
The water crisis is framed as a moral 
issue requiring collective efforts for 
effective solutions 
Combined support in drought efforts, 
reference to engaging different sectors, 
“Team Cape Town”, “the only way through 
this is together”, “care a little, save a lot”, 
“you should/should not…” 
Health threat The water crisis is framed as a threat to 
public health 
 
Resilience framing The water crisis is framed as a matter of 
resilience 
“Resilience”, preparing for long term 
change, “permanent basis” 
Threatening frame The water crisis is framed as requiring 
threats to high users by management 
“Warning”, “penalties”, “force them”, 
disapproving tone, reference to citizens' legal 
responsibilities 
Conflict framing The water crisis is framed as a fighting 
matter in opposition to the City and the 
people of Cape Town 
Military language, “aggressive”, “remain 
vigilant”, “beat this together”, “(water 
saving) heroes” 
  
5.5 The six main frames used by the CCT in their communications 
The third stage of analysis involved the analysis of framing aspects in relation to the communication items 
to identify prominent clusters which signified frames. Drawing on Entman’s (2007) idea that a fully 
developed frame generally enacts four functions (namely problem definition, causal analysis, moral 
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judgment and remedy promotion) six main frames were identified as tabulated in table 5.3. For all six 
frames the definition of the problem was unanimous – it was a water shortage caused by a three-year drought 
period. For this reason, table 5.3 does not include a column for problem definition. The six main frames 
are: ‘the City success story’; ‘obscurity and ambiguity’; ‘consumption is key’; ‘the situation is controllable’; 
‘together we can beat the drought’; and ‘us versus them’. Below is an explanation of the six main frames: 
5.5.1 The City success story 
This frame is primarily concerned with framing the City in a positive, heroic manner, with the City stating 
that it “... will continue to use absolutely all drought interventions at its disposal” (City of Cape Town, 
2017aj). The water shortage is framed externally as a hydrological drought phenomenon, and technical 
solutions and pressure management are suggested to minimise risk [see table 5.3]. It is implied that the 
situation is ‘controllable’ and under control as a result of the efforts of the City, who suggest that 
“…constant monitoring, updating and revision are key to the dynamic situation” (City of Cape Town, 
2017aj). This is also reflected in a response to the City’s Critical Water Shortage Disaster Plan, in which 
the City states that their “... planning approach is not a reflection on the City’s confidence in the water 
supply demand management and augmentation programme, but a strategy to ensure that the City is 
adequately prepared to manage increasingly severe drought conditions as they intensify over time” (City 
of Cape Town, 2017aj). The CCT is framed as a responsible management authority who are invested in the 
wellbeing of the public, with statements coming from the City, assuring the public that they “... will not 
allow a well-run city to run out of water and this will be achieved through progressive savings and our 
multi-layered augmentation plan to build water resilience” (City of Cape Town, 2017ai), and that “the City 
will do everything in its power to ... ensure that Phase 3: Day Zero (full-scale disaster implementation) 
never occurs” (City of Cape Town, 2018f). This frame promotes political proficiency for the City by 
presenting the drought as an anomaly; it does not acknowledge previous planning and infrastructural 
insufficiency and casts its provision and management of water as a success. The City is presented as reliable 
and responsible in that even in the face of a climatic anomaly it is able to provide technical solutions and 
keep Day Zero from occurring. 
5.5.2 Obscurity and ambiguity 
This frame is defined by vagueness, ambiguity and complexity, without clear positions for the CCT [see 
table 5.3]. Items hint at hydrological anomaly, various technical limitations, high levels of consumption or 
a combination of these problems as the cause of the water shortage, but do not provide firm ideas or 
positions. An example where this frame is prevalent is the series of photos of the WCWSS dams published 
by the City; taken from various angles, these images emphasize low water supply with pronounced sand 
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beds, beaches and rocks, dried up surrounding vegetation and dry mountain tops in the background. These 
images contain no text, notes or contextual information (City of Cape Town, 2017o; City of Cape Town, 
2017q; City of Cape Town, 2017v; City of Cape Town, 2017w; City of Cape Town, 2017x). These items 
are simplified to the point of obscurity; problems and solutions are either not suggested at all or are unclear. 
There is ambiguity about the nature and state of the drought as well as the solutions and response approach 
by the City. There is also temporal ambiguity regarding how long the drought will last. The City renders 
the matter complex in statements such as the following: “The procurement and commissioning of multiple 
new augmentation schemes in rapid time is going to be one of the largest and most complex expenditure 
programmes in the history of the City of Cape Town” (City of Cape Town, 2017ad). The City implies that 
they are the only appropriate administrator with the relevant knowledge and skills to deal with the situation. 
However, this frame also has a lack of measurability of the drought and thus a lack of accountability. 
5.5.3 Consumption is key 
This frame is a straightforward appeal to the public for reductions in water use [see table 5.3]. Critical to 
the problem is high levels of private consumption (individual and household) and the most effective method 
put forward to reduce risk is to drastically reduce consumption, especially personal and household 
consumption, which would thereby delay Day Zero. This appeared in many examples, including 
information guides which offered water-saving tips such as less frequent toilet flushing, shorter showers, 
fitting flow restrictors and using grey water, and encouraging residents to change their consumption habits 
in statements like, “the more you save, the less you pay – and more water remains in our dams” (City of 
Cape Town, 2017t). Similarly, the ‘save like a local’ campaign targeted tourists and visitors to be more 
careful when using water. Items from the campaign stated that “Cape Town is experiencing its worst 
drought ever” and recommended visitors “wash hands less frequently and use sanitiser instead. Only flush 
when you need to. Take short, stop-start showers. Don't leave the tap running while brushing teeth” (City 
of Cape Town, 2017k; City of Cape Town, 2017l; City of Cape Town, 2017m; City of Cape Town, 2017n). 
Another example focused on minimising flushing through a toilet pledge to be placed in bathroom stalls, 
which stated that the community using said bathroom “... pledge to: let it mellow if it’s yellow, only flush 
when necessary [and] not use the toilet as a dustbin” and reminded users that “every time we don’t flush, 
we’re saving about 9 litres of drinking water” (City of Cape Town, 2017i). Essentially in this frame the 
City renders the situation a matter of behavioural change; “Cape Town, this is the moment where we can 
bring about the fundamental behaviour change that is needed to save us all from running out of water. The 
time to act for everyone’s sake is now. So if we reduce the demand enough now, we can still get our water 
delivered to our houses and not have to queue daily for our allocation” (City of Cape Town, 2018ao). The 




5.5.4 The situation is controllable 
The primary focus of this frame is to offer assurance regarding the City’s ability to ensure order. The frame 
points to the hydrological drought and high levels of private consumption as the main causes of the problem 
[Table 5.3]. It indicates a mixture of technical solutions and demand management. Some solutions are 
suggested but the goal is not so much about promoting a solution, but rather about promoting the notion 
that the situation is manageable and by extension that it is/will be kept under control by the City. In one 
example, it states, “if everyone is frugal, residents will be able to get water from their taps throughout this 
year,” it then goes on to say that, “we [the City] will be ready, if we have to. But, Team Cape Town, if we 
all stick to 50l a day, we won’t have to” (City of Cape Town, 2018a). It is also noted that “additional sources 
will not stop the crisis, but help ease usage and allow the dams to refill over the next two years” (City of 
Cape Town, 2018a). The frame has a ‘keep calm and carry on’ undertone, with the City stating that “what 
we are currently facing is not unique. Many cities around the world have to deal with the impacts of climate 
change” (City of Cape Town, 2017ah), and that “this is going to become the new normal for Cape Town” 
(City of Cape Town. 2017aa). The situation may not necessarily be under control, nor fully understood, but 
the frame aims to provide a stabilising effect for the public. For this reason, the City states that it “...will 
continue working on a range of augmentation plans, fast-tracking processes as much as possible to bring 
alternative sources of drinking water online, including desalination, ground water extraction, and water 
reuse as we build a water-resilient Cape Town,” adding that “...together with the great water-saving efforts 
of residents, we will make it through this unprecedented drought” (City of Cape Town, 2017ak). Though 
similar to ‘the City success story,’ this frame is less orientated towards promoting the proficiency of the 
governing party, and more interested in ensuring stability and fostering peace of mind amongst the public. 
5.5.5 Together we can beat the drought 
This frame aims to unify the public and the City by setting up the drought as a common enemy. It focuses 
on high levels of private consumption [see table 5.3]. In addition to reducing private water consumption, 
the City is contributing to the war on the drought through technical solutions and demand management. 
The public and the City are united in a common cause to overcome the water shortage. In one example, the 
City state that they are “...doing absolutely everything in its power to get Cape Town through this drought 
but we need the support of our residents. Water is life. We urge you to join the efforts of the City and so 
many Capetonians to beat this drought together and to avoid Day Zero, the day when our taps run dry” 
(City of Cape Town, 2018d). Another example contains a series of posters of residents faces and quotes 
about how and why they are saving water, with residents stating that, “I’m saving water because our lives 
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depend on it,” “I’m saving water while we still have water to save,” “I’m saving water, so we don’t have to 
queue for it” and the common slogan “together we can avoid Day Zero” (City of Cape Town, 2018d). By 
appealing to collective effort, this frame uses notions of social belonging to persuade the public to get/be 
involved in practical consumption changes. One image depicts a dried-up dam with text overlaid, stating 
“Lets save, Cape Town! Together” (City of Cape Town, 2017a). In another example, the mayor expresses 
thanks to all “... visitors and locals for their efforts to continue to save water. We cannot do it without you” 
(City of Cape Town, 2018b). This frame also uses military and/or sport language to facilitate groupthink 
through phrases such as “Team Cape Town” (City of Cape Town, 2018a) and “beat this drought” (City of 
Cape Town, 2018d). The City also states that “Day Zero can be avoided” and that “Capetonians have done 
amazing work to save water. Most residents are saving water but we need every single person to use the 
prescribed 87 litres per person per day. If we don’t have everyone restricting their water consumption, we 
will reach Day Zero…” (City of Cape Town, 2017ao). Additionally, the plight of the drought is portrayed 
as the great leveller bringing together disparate classes of Cape Town residents.  
5.5.6 Us versus them 
This frame externalises the problem, causes and solutions for the water crisis away from the City. It focuses 
on high levels of private consumption and places much of the responsibility of remedying the situation on 
the public, who are cast as needing to change their behaviour in order to achieve the necessary water 
reductions [see table 5.3]. Focus is shifted away from the City’s efforts by putting forward the idea that the 
actions of the public are most critical to remedying the situation. In one example, which speaks about level 
6B (50 litres daily limit per person) restrictions coming into place, the City expresses that “Day Zero is now 
likely” and that “60% of Capetonians won’t save water and we must now force them” (City of Cape Town, 
2018ao). The public are framed as misbehaving and not considerate enough regarding the situation. For this 
reason the City states that they had “...to install water management devices at 18 597 high consumption 
households across the city so far where contraventions have occurred” and adds that “the Water and 
Sanitation Department staff are working extremely long days to help the City conserve water by restricting 
delinquent users. We have begged people to save water, but we cannot allow the flagrant abuse of water to 
continue unabated” (City of Cape Town, 2017at). In another example, the CCT state that they “... have 
issued more than enough warnings and pleaded with residents to reduce consumption, but there are still 
too many people who continue to flout water restrictions… but the time for asking people to reduce 
excessive consumption is over and we will now forcibly restrict those households who continue to 
contravene water restrictions” (City of Cape Town, 2017ac). In this frame, the CCT sets themselves up 




Table 5.3: Key frames identified 
Frame  Causal analysis Remedy promotion Moral judgements  
THE CITY 
SUCCESS STORY 




CCT is a responsible 
management authority  
OBSCURITY AND 
AMBIGUITY 
Hydrological drought, technical 
limitations, and high levels of 
consumption caused the water 
shortage 
Solutions to the 
problem are not clear 
Frame is defined by 
vagueness and ambiguity 




High levels of private consumption 
(individual and household) was the 




Most effective method to 





Hydrological drought together with 
high levels of private consumption 
(individual and household) caused 
the water shortage 
Mixture of technical 
solutions and demand 
management 
Ensure the CCT’s ability 
to ensure order 
 
TOGETHER WE 
CAN BEAT THE 
DROUGHT 
Hydrological drought together with 
high levels of private consumption 
(individual and household) caused 
the water shortage 
Private consumption 
reduction, technical 
solutions and demand 
management 
Public and City are united 
in common cause to 




High levels of private consumption 
(individual and household) caused 
the water shortage 
Water-saving 
behaviour by the 
public 
Problem, cause, solution 
and responsibility are 
externalised away from 
the City 
5.6 Frequency of frames 
Once the six main frames used in communications by the CCT were established, data was further analysed 
to identify the frequency and temporal spread of frames occurring. Figure 5.2 and figure 5.3 illustrate the 
frequency of frames in the positioning/status stream (stream A) and the instructional/educational stream 
(stream B) respectively as they occurred between March 2017 and March 2018. Figure 5.2 and figure 5.3 
are presented in a timeline format to illustrate trends and shifts over time. 
 
In terms of general temporal range, months with markedly high volumes of frames identified coincide with 
months with higher volume of items released by the CCT for both stream A and stream B. The frames in 
stream A are more spread out over the 13 months with a notable increase for all six frames between October 
2017 and January 2019 [see figure 5.2] when the crisis was at its peak. Stream B is more concentrated in 
October, November, December of 2017 and February 2018 (with the exception of the ‘obscurity and 
ambiguity’ frame which also occurred in March and July of 2017) [see figure 5.3]. In terms of highest 
frequencies by month, stream A had a peak of the highest frequencies occurring for all six streams in 
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November 2017, and stream B saw the highest frequencies occurring in December 2017. 
 
Overall, the frame which consistently occurred the most in stream A was ‘the City success story’ frame, 
followed closely by the ‘consumption is key’ frame [see figure 5.2]. For stream B, the frame with the most 
occurrence across the 13-month period was the ‘together we can beat the drought’ frame, followed closely 
by ‘the situation is controllable’ frame [see figure 5.3]. Reflecting on the prevalence of these frames more 
specifically, the frame with the overall highest frequency by month for stream A occurred in November 
2017 and was ‘the City success story’ frame [see figure 5.2]. For stream B the frame with the overall highest 
frequency was ‘the situation is controllable’ frame in December 2017 [see figure 5.3].  
 
All six frames were identified in the positioning/status stream (stream A) to some degree [see figure 5.2]. 
However, in the instructional/educational stream (stream B), all but one of the six frames were identified – 
the outlier being the ‘us versus them’ frame [see figure 5.3]. The ‘us versus them’ frame was also the frame 
with the least occurrences overall. In the case of stream A, it did occur but was the least occurring frame 
across the timeframe, while in stream B it did not occur once. For a breakdown of results, see appendix III. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter relayed the findings of the research. It began by offering a breakdown of the numbers and 
types of communication items included in the analysis. This included 10 types of communication items 
comprised of speeches, statements, public summaries, posters, pamphlets, photographs, presentations, 
information guides, infographics and a newsletter. It then explained the emergence of two main streams 
within the data set, namely the positioning/status stream, stream A, and the instructional/educational stream, 
stream B. The next section noted all the characteristics of the frames which were identified in the data, 
which included multiple aspects relating to the status of the crisis, the purpose of the communication item, 
the priorities put forward, the cause suggested, the rendering of the problem, the temporal framing, the 
reach of the crisis, the position of management, the placement of responsibility, the understanding of effects 
relating to the crisis and the affected demographics amongst other aspects. Following this was an overview 
of the six key frames that emerged, namely ‘the City success story’; ‘obscurity and ambiguity’; 
‘consumption is key’; ‘the situation is controllable’; ‘together we can beat the drought’; and ‘us versus 
them’. Finally, the last section provided an overview of the frequency of frames occurring over the crisis 
period (03/2017 – 03/2018) with a timeline to illustrate this, showing that as the crisis peaked, so too did 
the volume of frames present in communications released surge. It also noted frames with the highest and 
lowest counts over the 13-month period. The next chapter discusses the project’s findings. 
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This chapter discusses the trends and shifts in the CCT’s framing of the water crisis. The chapter is divided 
into three main sections: section 6.2 discusses each frame as it relates to wider literature; section 6.3 
explores the temporal trends of the framing in the two stream of the City’s communications; and section 
6.4 critically analyses whether the delivery of messages to the public through communications was the 
product of clear strategies or a less coherent, less organised process. 
6.2 A theoretical analysis of the City’s framing of the drought 
Building on the results of the previous chapter, which offered an overview of the six key frames identified 
by the analysis, this section offers a more critical breakdown of each frame as it relates to the literature. In 
line with the ideas of Kohl and Knox (2016), the water crisis was not an entirely external and objective 
occurrence; intentional or not, the water crisis communications were used by management to frame various 
aspects of the drought and to assert City agendas through information and messages released. By defining 
the water shortage through particular frames, the City could promote certain courses of action, influence 
the sense of perceived risk for the public, and affect how the crisis was experienced and understood (Laws 
& Rein, 2003). This section offers a deeper understanding of each frame identified during the analysis stage 
of the project. 
6.2.1  ‘The City success story’ – more about the City than success 
This frame positions the City in a heroic light and advances ideas of power and capability associated with 
the City. Central to this is the external placement of the cause of the problem. Treating the water shortage 
as a wholly external hydrological phenomenon implies that the City’s pre-drought infrastructure, planning 
and policy was adequate and that the water shortage was entirely the result of a drought anomaly. This 
framing implies the City’s efforts to manage the crisis are admirable and positive, and not necessarily an 
obligatory responsibility (Kohl & Knox, 2016). It overlooks the fact that infrastructure and planning was 
possibly outdated (Ziervogel, 2019) or insufficient. It focuses on technical solutions, water pressure 
management, and showcasing the City’s attempts to avoid Day Zero. It implies that the City is a trustworthy 
46 
 
and responsible management authority. In this way the City’s actions to take responsibility to remedy the 
situation work to cast City efforts as successful in that they were still able to provide water to the residents 
of Cape Town and thereby ensure a well-functioning city. By promoting political proficiency, this frame 
highlights how frames are inherently about power and how the institution in power, in this case the City, 
constructs and directs a narrative, position the public, and create structure and meaning for understanding 
and experiencing a situation (Entman, 2007). Generally, frames are constructed which favour the interests 
of the institution in power. Interestingly, this frame manages to both draw on scientific and seemingly value-
neutral explanations of the drought while also promoting the implicit political reliability of the City (Kohl 
& Knox, 2016). 
6.2.2  ‘Obscurity and ambiguity’ – a situation too difficult for public understanding 
A water shortage is a complex situation, however it is the responsibility of the authority managing the 
resource to take appropriate actions to assess the nature of the situation and enact necessary steps to 
minimise threats associated therewith. They should also be able to communicate this effectively to the 
public. This is not to say that the City did not do this, but effective communication requires clarity and the 
vagueness and ambiguity of this complex frame provides nothing concrete for the public because this frame 
is prone to fragmentation. When an issue is framed in multiple ways it leads to gaps in understanding the 
problem and therefore hinders appropriate ways forward (Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016). This frame is 
problematic because the communications lack intention and purpose, and do not reflect clear objectives of 
the City. Problems and solutions were either not suggested or were unclear, and there was ambiguity about 
the nature of the drought, including temporal predictions. While there may have been very real ambiguity 
with regards to how the drought would play out, the frame is controversial in that it is not directive, neither 
reassuring nor condemning. The only aspect with a strong resonating factor in this frame is that the City is 
the only appropriate administrator with the necessary knowledge and skills to handle the situation. There is 
a kind of ‘leave it to the professionals’ attitude which comes through, which is also associated with ‘the 
City success story,’ but as a crisis heightens, this kind of framing can lead to frustration amongst the public 
(Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016). By rendering something complicated, it allows for ambiguity, which in turn 
allows for a lack of measurability and, by extension, a lack of accountability. 
6.2.3  ‘Consumption is key’ – pleading to the public 
In times of acute and severe water shortage, implementing water restrictions and targeting water 
consumption reduction behaviour is an effective short-term solution (Dolnicar et al., 2012). While this is 
true even in best case scenarios, it is especially true in cases where there is insufficient drought policy and 
planning. For this reason, during the Millennium drought, the Australian government targeted private water-
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use reductions by encouraging personal-use targets (Turner et al., 2016). The literature reports that targeting 
behaviour change is highly effective for managing a water shortage (Dziegielewski, 1991; Dolnicar et al., 
2012; Turner et al., 2016; Liang et al., 2018; Palazo et al., 2019). This is especially relevant for public 
communications, which should convey the seriousness of the threats likely to occur without major 
behaviour change (Dziegielewski, 1991). This frame implied that reducing water-use amongst the public 
was the most effective solution to reduce the chance of Day Zero actualising. This frame communicates 
that the main problem is high levels of consumption and remedying the situation is largely a matter of 
behaviour change. While it is possible for a condemning tone to come through, this encouraging frame 
attempts to be apolitical and was primarily delivered through information, advice about water saving 
measures and encouraging messages. This was similar to the Australian case where education, water value, 
behaviour change and the collective good were emphasized over punishments and threats (Turner et al., 
2016). Although it must be said that, while lasting much longer than the Cape Town drought, the threats 
associated with the Australian drought did not reach the extreme precariousness associated with the threat 
of Day Zero. Nevertheless, the massive drop in consumption levels for Cape Town highlighted the problem 
of wasteful usage, and reinforced ideas of targeting behaviour change for effective water reductions 
associated with this frame. 
6.2.4  ‘The situation is controllable’ – because the City cannot be out of control 
Due to the fact that the City is the authority responsible for managing the situation, it is useful for them to 
focus on offering stability and assurance to the public. This frame expresses that the situation is manageable 
and is, or will be, under control as a result of City efforts. This frame has a predictably high frequency of 
occurrence because a frame is more likely to be accepted when it can offer a sense of security to the public 
and reassure them that their daily lives are not at risk (Laws & Rein, 2003). The water shortage is 
communicated as being the result of a hydrological drought but manageable through reducing private 
consumption of water. This is similar to ‘the City success story’ but here the City are more concerned with 
instilling public stability and peace of mind. In the case of most urban water supplies systems, urban water 
management is responsible for water-related decisions, actions and strategies. Urban water management 
should ensure adequate access, quality and quantity of water to residents, which is to say that it should 
ensure water supply is under control (Neto, 2016). Therefore, it is not surprising that none of the City’s 
communications hinted that the situation was out of control. According to this frame, it is not conceivable 
to have the situation out of the City’s control, which is why supply-side options are mentioned in 
conjunction with demand-side management. While supply-side management is important, focusing on 
demand-side management is associated with higher effectiveness and less input for management (Turner et 
al., 2016). Hence the City’s push for managing the situation by controlling private consumption in Cape 
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Town and thereby ensuring the City’s ability to control a crisis. 
6.2.5  ‘Together we can beat the drought’ – united by a common struggle 
This frame makes a strong appeal to social cohesion and collective responsibility to encourage residents to 
adopt water-saving behaviours. While it was necessary to communicate the severity of the situation in order 
to prompt behaviour change (Dziegielewski, 1991), the City used words of encouragement and a military 
and sports register, employing phraseology such as “Team Cape Town” (City of Cape Town, 2018a) and 
“beat the drought” (City of Cape Town, 2018d), to frame themselves and the public as unified in a common 
cause to overcome the water shortage. Promoting the collective value of water as a common good helps to 
encourage the public to change their consumption habits (Turner et al., 2016). For this reason, the City 
focused on communal effort and social belonging as drivers for encouraging a collective valuing of water 
as a shared resource. The water shortage was portrayed as a monumental leveller, bringing together Cape 
Town’s extremely unequal society in the crisis (Robins, 2019). Whether this was indeed true or not, this 
frame suggests it was the case.  
6.2.6  ‘Us versus them’ – the onus is on the public  
Whether out of sheer exasperation and desperation, or strategic psychological manipulation, this frame 
turns attention outwards, away from the actions of the City. Instead, the problem, causes, and solutions are 
externalised and responsibility is placed on the public. This frame is built on the idea that messages about 
losses seem to be stronger drivers for behaviour change than messages about gains (Liang et al., 2018). The 
City asserts that they have pursued every avenue available to alleviate the water shortage and that the 
situation is salvageable only by the public taking the necessary actions to reduce their water consumption. 
In this frame the public are viewed as misbehaving, irresponsible and contributing massively to the crisis. 
The City sets itself up against the public and indicates its power as the authority through threats and scare 
tactics. It places responsibility of avoiding Day Zero in the hands of the public. Accordingly, the City must 
therefore fight the public in order to win the war against the drought. None of the City’s communications 
in the data set said that the situation is out of control, but it was implied that without drastic drops in 
consumption the future could become unpredictable and precarious. According to this frame it was largely 
up to the public to change their consumption behaviour to avoid this. The excuses and challenges expressed 
by the City, whether real or imagined, worked to reduce the responsibility of the City’s response to the 
crisis. Interestingly, this view is also reflected in the City’s pre-drought position, when De Lille and Kesson 
(2017), note some high-consumption residents lack of regard for conserving water. According to Laws and 
Rein (2003), an effective frame should among other things ensure the lived experience of the public is not 
threatened to such an extent that it becomes impossible for the public to concede the message the frame 
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conveys. This frame contradicts this principle in that the frame does threaten the sense of future security in 
the collective mind of the public. Perhaps this is why this frame was not utilised as frequently as others. 
This frame is the least occurring frame in stream A and does not occur at all in stream B. While scare tactics 
may seem to be strong drivers in motivating behaviour change, it is possible that these worked to the 
contrary, making the public shut-off from the underlying agenda which was essentially to encourage 
behaviour change and consumption reduction, albeit in a harsh manner. However, it is also true that the 
more the public perceived the situation as being high risk, the more likely they were to change their 
behaviour (Liang et al., 2018). Nevertheless, this frame was neither reassuring nor encouraging for the 
public. 
6.3 The temporal trends in the two streams of the City’s communications 
This section deals with the temporal shifts of the frames for each stream in relation to the state of the 
drought. Essentially, it attempts to tell the story of the water shortage over time using the frames previously 
identified as a lens to analyse how the situation was being interpreted by the City and presented to the public 
through communication items made available online. 
6.3.1  The build up 
Although there had been prior warnings and cause for concern, officially, the water shortage crisis began 
on the 29th of March 2017, when Cape Town was declared a local disaster area (Ziervogel, 2019). The 
announcement was made in an official statement (stream A) by the Mayor, within which she stated, “I have 
given an instruction that we simply must do everything we can to start implementing these new schemes in 
the current financial year already and find the budget to do so in order to augment our water supplies as 
soon as possible” (City of Cape Town, 2017y). The frames used in this statement were ‘the City success 
story’ and ‘the situation is controllable’, with the City focusing on managing the situation via technical 
solutions in order to ensure normal urban functioning continues. It is plausible that on some level there was 
still a sense that the winter of 2017 would bring enough rain to replenish the supply dams. 
 
The City’s communications in the following month, April 2017, expressed no major reference to the water 
situation. Only a single statement (stream A) in the data set mentioned the drought in passing when speaking 
about national soccer and the need for collaboration for water-wise management of sport fields (City of 
Cape Town, 2017z). The notable absence is interesting considering the fact that a disaster had just been 
declared. However, it is worth noting that at this point the ‘consumption is key’ frame enters the narrative, 
reflecting the City’s concern for water-use reductions. The City also released a series of photos (stream B) 
of the WCWSS at this time (City of Cape Town, 2017v; City of Cape Town, 2017w; City of Cape Town, 
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2017x; City of Cape Town, 2017y). The photos depict low levels of water in the supply dams but offer little 
other information or actionable advice. This ambiguity employs the ‘obscurity and ambiguity’ frame and 
reflects that the City was unclear and unsure about the nature of the situation, the future scenarios associated 
therewith and the ideal course of action to take at this time. 
 
May of 2017 did not see more communications than the previous months, however, a slight sense of urgency 
entered the narrative. At this time, the term Day Zero begins to be used, although the City are not entirely 
comfortable with the lack of surety it implies (Ziervogel, 2019). While May marked the start of the rainy 
season for Cape Town, there was a growing concern within the City regarding the precariousness of the 
situation. A Water Resilience Task Team [WRTT] was established to provide a Water Resilience Plan 
which was to answer to worst case scenarios for how the water shortage might play out and what the City 
would have to do in order to manage the situation (Robins, 2019). It was implied that the future of water 
security in Cape Town was undergoing a shift; in a statement (stream A), the mayor stated that “this is 
going to become the new normal for Cape Town” (City of Cape Town, 2017aa). Continuing from the 
previous months, the frames that appear are ‘consumption is key’ and ‘the situation is controllable’. The 
‘together we can beat the drought’ frame also enters the narrative as the City starts to urge the public to 
make changes in their own water behaviour. 
 
The following two months are relatively quiet in terms of communications released by the City. In June 
2017, level 4 water restrictions were implemented (Ziervogel, 2019) but no official communications were 
released (at least according to the data set). In July, a few more photos (stream B) of arid supply dams are 
made available (City of Cape Town, 2017p; City of Cape Town, 2017q). Once again, these trigger the 
‘obscurity and ambiguity’ frame because they provide some visual data but remain ambiguous and do not 
offer insight about how the public should interpret or act upon them. There is also a statement (stream A) 
released which continues to follow the trend of the prior months by promoting the ‘consumption is key’ 
and ‘the situation is controllable’ frames. 
 
In August of 2017, the situation starts to become alarming, with the City putting out drought-related 
statements more frequently and drawing on nearly all identified frames. These statements talk about the 
installation of water management devices at high consumption households, procuring necessary 
technologies for planned augmentation schemes (desalination, water reuse, groundwater extraction) and 
there are multiple references to the need to become more resilient (City of Cape Town, 2017ac; City of 
Cape Town, 2017ad; City of Cape Town, 2017ae). The tone is slightly desperate at times with the Mayor 
saying, “as we prepare for the hot summer months ahead, it is imperative that the consumption does not 
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spike” (City of Cape Town, 2017ad). The City also became more threatening, with statements like, “we will 
now forcibly restrict those households who continue to contravene water restrictions” (City of Cape Town, 
2017ac). There were no stream B items – i.e. educational materials – released in August. 
 
September 2017 was considerably quieter with only a single statement coming from the City relating to the 
water shortage. However, this is not to say that the City was inactive in their drought management at this 
time. At this point, level 5 water restrictions were implemented (Ziervogel, 2019). In the statement there 
was a strong appeal made to the commercial sector to reduce water. It also included links to the ThinkWater 
website and water calculator, as well as an email address for queries, which were intentionally set up to 
help facilitate water-use reductions amongst the public (City of Cape Town, 2017af). The frames that 
appeared at this time were ‘consumption is key’, ‘the situation is controllable’ and ‘together we can beat 
the drought’, which indicates that the City was following on previous months in their focus on private water 
consumption behaviour. As was the case in August, there were no stream B items released in September. 
6.3.2  Crisis climax 
Approaching the end of the rainy season, which proved to be another dry winter, it became clear that the 
City lacked a contingency plan to deal with a crisis of this magnitude. In October 2017, the City took more 
active measures to mitigate the drought. The Mayor assembled a special task team and held daily meetings 
for ongoing monitoring and a quicker response time (Ziervogel, 2019). As a result of the daily meetings 
and reshuffling of water management, this high-level task team took on the primary responsibility of the 
drought response campaign, a role usually associated with the internal WSD (Ziervogel, 2019). As part of 
the task team, the external communications firm known as Resolve was brought in to manage public 
communications. The results showed no evidence that the crisis was reframed with Resolve’s input, 
however, all the frames were utilised and the frequency for all frames increased. At this time, the City stated 
their “...commitment ... to communicate directly with all Capetonians” and to “make the dam levels and 
consumption data available on a daily basis” (City of Cape Town, 2017ai). More educational and 
instructional items of communication associated with stream B began to be distributed as the Day Zero 
campaign was put into action. The City released a poster for finding and fixing leaks (City of Cape Town, 
2017f), a presentation about the Critical Water Shortage Disaster Plan (City of Cape Town, 2017b), a Level 
5 restrictions infographic (City of Cape Town, 2017h), a water saving checklist (City of Cape Town, 2017t), 
another leaks guide (City of Cape Town, 2017e) and a banner (City of Cape Town, 2017a). As a result of 
the influx of items, ‘the City success story’, ‘consumption is key’, ‘the situation is controllable’ and 
‘together we can beat the drought’ frames began to appear in stream B, with the key focus being on reducing 
private water consumption and encouraging responsible water-use, a sentiment captured in the information 
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guide about leaks which stated, “the more you save, the less you pay – and more water remains in our 
dams” (City of Cape Town, 2017t). There were also multiple statements released by the Mayor and her 
team which dealt with the water situation, including the expectations of the business sector, the plans for 
augmentation schemes and public communication (City of Cape Town, 2017ag; City of Cape Town, 
2017ah; City of Cape Town, 2017ai). The City utilised multiple frames including ‘obscurity and ambiguity’, 
‘consumption is key’, ‘the situation is controllable’ and ‘together we can beat the drought’. However, 
notably ‘the City success story’ was the frame used most, which indicates the City’s desire to appear as the 
protagonist in their narrative, with the Mayor stating in many variations, that they “want to assure residents 
again that we [the City] will not allow a well-run city to run out of water and this will be achieved through 
progressive savings and out [the City’s] multi-layered augmentation plan to build water resilience” (City 
of Cape Town, 2017ah) and “the City has always been a very responsible player in the Western Cape Water 
Supply System” (City of Cape Town, 2017c). They also released a public summary which described the 
Critical Water Shortage Plan and declared Cape Town to be in stage one of disaster management (City of 
Cape Town, 2017c). The WCWSS closed the rainy season on October 31st with 344 657 million litres in 
supply (just over a third of the systems’ capacity), which signalled extreme concern, as it meant there was 
no way the City could ensure usual levels of supply until the following winter (CSAG, 2019).  
 
In November 2017, the City was in full-blown response mode with 10 statements being released by the 
Mayor in one month. Contents of these items ranged from state borehole/spring refurbishment (City of 
Cape Town, 2017aj; City of Cape Town, 2017ak), the matter of evaporation (City of Cape Town, 2017am), 
assessing unused city pipelines (City of Cape Town, 2017al), potentially removing alien vegetation in 
catchment areas (City of Cape Town, 2017an), surveying for additional aquifer sites (City of Cape Town, 
2017ap; City of Cape Town, 2017ar), and the alarming spike in consumption, which was partially off-set 
by unusual summer rainfall (City of Cape Town, 2017as). There was also a statement which offered more 
comprehensive information regarding the weekly water dashboard (City of Cape Town, 2017aq). Every 
one of the six frames was identifiable in stream A items in November, possibly due to the high volume of 
items released at this time. The increase in communications was likely due to the contributing efforts of the 
external communications group, Resolve, though it is difficult to distinguish this with certainty as 
communications were ultimately released under the umbrella of the City. At this point, the term Day Zero 
was officially adopted for the water crisis (Ziervogel, 2019). For this reason, the City also released a 
statement which outlined the meaning of Day Zero and when and how it would likely play out. The City 
stated that “Day Zero can be avoided. Capetonians have done amazing work to save water. Most residents 
are saving water but we need every single person to use the prescribed 87 litres per person per day. If we 
don’t have everyone restricting their water consumption, we will reach Day Zero in May” (City of Cape 
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Town, 2017ao). It is worth noting that the frame with the highest count for this particularly active month 
was ‘the City success story’ frame which indicates that the City was invested in the idea that they were 
capable of managing the situation. Stream B items for November included a poster-style announcement of 
rationing through pressure management to extend supply (City of Cape Town, 2017r), a water saving 
plumbing checklist (City of Cape Town, 2017u), and a poster for a ‘permission cubicle’ which promoted a 
social agreement of minimal flushing in shared bathrooms (City of Cape Town, 2017i). All of these items 
triggered the ‘consumption is key’, ‘the situation is controllable’ and ‘together we can beat the drought’ 
frames, once again showing the strong focus on reducing private consumption as the key factor for 
controlling the situation.  
 
Going into December 2017, water levels were at a critical point. Stream A items reiterated the installation 
of water management devices (City of Cape Town, 2017at), water rationing (City of Cape Town, 2017j) 
and pressure reduction (City of Cape Town, 2017s). Given the exacerbating effects of summer, the City 
also pleaded with the public to reduce consumption, stating, “we appeal to residents to please step up their 
water-saving efforts as we can only get through this together” (City of Cape Town, 2017au). At this time 
the City adopted a more aggressive approach to “forcibly lower water usage” (City of Cape Town, 2017j) 
and restrict “delinquent users” (City of Cape Town, 2017at). All but one of the frames appear in stream A 
items in December, the exception being ‘the situation is controllable’, which the City stopped using for 
stream A items. At no point does the City say the situation is out of control but there is simply no mention 
made as to whether the situation was or was not controllable, suggesting their uncertainty regarding the 
situation. For stream B items, December saw the launch of the ‘save like a local’ campaign which 
specifically targeted the influx of tourists in Cape Town over the holiday season. This included a pamphlet, 
poster, door hanger and tent card, as well as banners set up at strategic places around the city (City of Cape 
Town, 2017k; City of Cape Town, 2017l; City of Cape Town, 2017m; City of Cape Town, 2017n). The 
main message of these items was to make visitors aware of the severe drought Cape Town was experiencing 
and to offer simple water saving advice, telling people to “wash hands less frequently and use sanitiser 
instead. Only flush when you need to. Take short, stop-start showers [and] don't leave the tap running while 
brushing teeth” (City of Cape Town, 2017k; City of Cape Town, 2017l; City of Cape Town, 2017m; City 
of Cape Town, 2017n). Additionally, an information guide about pressure management was released at this 
time (City of Cape Town, 2017g). The City also published a series of posters with portraits of individual 
residents and overlaying text statements about why these individuals were taking measures in their own 
lives to save water (City of Cape Town, 2017d). As with the previous month, the frames that dominated in 
stream B in December 2017 were ‘consumption is key’, ‘the situation is controllable’ and ‘together we can 
beat the drought’, as the City aimed to encourage non-abiding Cape Town residents and visitors alike to 
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not only be aware of the crisis but also to adopt measures to reduce their water use.  
6.3.3  New year, new normal 
The uncertainty of the water shortage continued into the new year of 2018, with level 6 water restrictions 
being implemented on the 1st of January 2018 (Ziervogel, 2019). The statements from the City at this time 
dealt with ground water abstraction (City of Cape Town, 2018f; City of Cape Town, 2018g) and the 
proposed drought charge (City of Cape Town, 2018h), which was soon dropped (City of Cape Town, 
2018j). Following on December, the City used all frames with the exception of ‘the situation is 
controllable’. Interestingly, no stream B items were released in January, during the peak of the crisis. 
Perhaps all advice and suggestions for water behaviour amongst the public had already been communicated 
in previous items, or perhaps the City were utilising other platforms for communication which were not 
included on their website and therefore not reflected in this study. Nevertheless, the idiosyncrasy is notable 
simply because it was at this point that level 6 water restrictions were implemented, which had high 
expectations of the public for limiting water usage, and therefore higher frequency of items would be 
expected. 
 
Despite an unmet request from the Western Cape Province in 2015 for National Disaster Risk Management 
to declare a disaster (albeit in the early stages), the drought was finally declared a national disaster affecting 
three provinces in February 2018 (Ziervogel, 2019). And yet despite concerns being high, the data from 
this study found communications to the Cape Town public by the City to be relatively few in February 
2018.32 The only stream A item was an annexure (relating to an item from October 2017) containing some 
information about the City’s Critical Water Shortage Plan (City of Cape Town, 2018c). At this point the 
only frames that the City were engaging were ‘the City success story’ and ‘obscurity and ambiguity’, with 
statements like “a water augmentation plan is designed to protect existing water rights by diversifying 
supply from reliance on groundwater to other sources” (City of Cape Town, 2018c), which continues to 
centralise the City’s role as capable management and sounds promising but is rather open-ended. In stream 
B, the City released a guide for reading water meters and water management devices in their continued 
effort to engage residents to be conservative in their water usage, and to be vigilant of leaks (City of Cape 
Town, 2018d). The City also released a PowerPoint presentation of the water outlook at the time, with an 
overview of dams, consumption, augmentation and other measures implemented for water reduction, and 
cost recovery (City of Cape Town, 2018e). At this time, the City released an interesting newsletter, titled 
‘City News, Issue 44: Day Zero Residents Newsletter’, which featured short articles, colourful infographics, 
 
32 Once again, it is worth noting that it is possible that the City may have been using other methods to communicate 
with the public other than the data provided online. 
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pictures, and catchy phrases all relating to the Cape Town water shortage (City of Cape Town, 2018a). It 
included information covered in many of the previous items but was delivered to the public in a more 
digestible, accessible and stimulating manner. It summarised the drought situation, dam levels, pressure 
reduction and tariff increases, and it emphasised the threat of reaching Day Zero, and how to effectively 
utilise 50 litres of water per person daily (City of Cape Town, 2018a). It also dealt with other matters 
relating to water such as health threats, plastic bottle recycling and augmentation plans (City of Cape Town, 
2018a). Collectively, the stream B items used all frames except ‘us versus them’, although the diverse range 
of contents included in the newsletter triggered a wide range of the frames coming into use at this point. 
 
In March of 2018, City communications were rather quiet. Only one stream A item was released which 
provided information about using seawater for flushing and filling pools, which the City stressed was not 
ideal because, “the chemical compounds found in seawater are known to interfere with the biological 
treatment processes that occur at the treatment plants. For the reasons above, the use of seawater for 
flushing toilets and for topping up conventional swimming pools is not envisaged in the long term” (City of 
Cape Town, 2018b). It was necessary for the City to address this because seawater was suggested as being 
ideal for non-potable water use due to it being so widely available in the Cape Town area. At this time, the 
only frame triggered was ‘obscurity and ambiguity’ because the problem is presented as complex and 
solutions not entirely clear. In line with the low communications count in stream A, there were no stream 
B items released in March. Nevertheless, due to a massive reduction in private consumption through 
behavioural interventions and pressure management amongst other ventures, Day Zero was officially 
delayed to 2019 in March (Robins, 2019). This marked a break from the year long crisis. While this was a 
massive relief for the City and Cape Town residents alike, restrictions were not lifted until 2018’s winter 
rains had sufficiently refilled the supply dams. 
6.4 City communications – a clear strategic narrative or the product of a less systematic 
process? 
This final section explores how the City relayed the drought narrative to the public and whether this process 
was coherent and organised, or more contrary and capricious. It also considers the effectiveness of the 
City’s communications. According to Entman (2007), a fully formed frame provides answers to the public 
regarding where responsibility lies, who is entitled to what, and it normalises certain narratives. The City’s 
response drew on six dominant frames, which were not mutually exclusive. Each frame was fully formed 
and there was not one single frame which dominated the narrative in the case of Cape Town's water crisis. 
While each frame provided a structure for understanding the water shortage crisis and there were overlaps 
between the frames regarding certain aspects, there were also idiosyncrasies and contradictions (around the 
56 
 
same time period and even within single items of communication). This section explores whether this was 
problematic. While it is logical to think that conflicting messages detract from the overall objectives of the 
authority, it is also plausible that contrary to this the variety of frames made it possible for messages to 
resonate with different audiences for a wider range of public responses – both positive and negative. 
6.4.1  Strong frames and overlapping aspects 
Amongst the City’s communication items were notable frames with high prevalence and certain aspects 
which overlapped; these repetitions imply particularly important aspects for the City when defining the 
crisis. The strong frames were those which resonated with the City in their desired drought narrative (Chong 
& Drukman, 2007). The overlap of the frames ‘consumption is key’ and ‘the situation is controllable’ 
highlight how the City centred their drought-relief efforts on consumption reduction and how they 
emphasised their own ability to maintain control over the situation. Together, these strong frames in both 
streams worked to offer comfort and stability to the public who relied on the City to ensure the supply of 
water, while also urging them to adopt water-saving changes in their personal behaviour. It is not surprising 
that in the positioning/status stream A, there was also a strong push for ‘the City success story’, which is 
indicative of the City’s self-promoting agenda, naturally tied to their need to be identified as a managing 
authority capable of handling any crisis threatening the daily functioning of the city which they are 
responsible for. Similarly, it makes sense that in the educational/instructional stream B, the ‘together we 
can beat the drought’ frame was used frequently, together with ‘consumption is key’ and ‘the situation is 
controllable’. This combination of strong frames in stream B not only encouraged the people of Cape Town 
to actively participate in water-saving efforts, but that this cooperation and joint effort was critical for 
avoiding Day Zero.  
6.4.2  Frame pluralism, ambiguity and contradictions 
In contrast to the strong and overlapping frames were the ambiguous, contradictory and plural frames, 
which illustrated deficits and a lack of coherence in the City’s communications responses. Ambiguous 
framing is considered problematic because it may lead to fragmentation in policy and management 
(Hurlbert & Gupta, 2016). One of the areas of ambiguity was the temporal extent of the crisis. A crisis is 
usually implied to be temporary and in the build-up phase (March 2017 – September 2017) it was often 
implied to be so; for example, in August 2017 it was announced that “the City has no plans to perform 
localised water-shedding” (City of Cape Town, 2017ad). However, in the crisis climax phase (October 
2017 – December 2017) this shifted with the ‘new normal’ narrative, implying long-term potential effects, 
with the Mayor stating in November 2017 that, “if we don’t have everyone restricting their water 
consumption, we will reach Day Zero in May” (City of Cape Town, 2017ao). The most notable 
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contradiction amongst the City’s six dominant frames was ‘us versus them’ which went against the 
messages of ‘the situation is controllable’ and ‘together we can beat the drought’ frames, in that it largely 
implied the situation was the consequence of a delinquent public, making it no longer possible for the City 
to ensure a secure future for Cape Town’s residents. Interestingly, ‘us versus them’ was the least occurring 
frame in stream A and did not appear at all in stream B. There may have been reason to feel that the public 
were slow to respond and not concerned enough to cooperate from the City’s perspective, and therefore 
scare tactics and disciplinary interventions could have been justified for shocking the public into action. 
However the lack of appearance of this frame is not entirely surprising as, the low frequency of this frame 
occurring suggests that when the City adopted a condescending, judgmental and passive-aggressive 
approach, it may have prompted apathetic and even defiant responses from people, which would be 
counterproductive for the City’s intentions to catalyse action from the public. As the crisis heightened, the 
public became frustrated and began demanding answers which this frame could not provide (Robins, 2019). 
It is suggested here that the negative public response towards the City’s handling of the water crisis was in 
large part due to this particular idiosyncrasy which essentially and unfairly shifted responsibility on the 
public. Although this was overall the least used frame, the total non-occurrence in stream B also indicates 
the different approaches taken in different media formats, with the nature of stream B items being more 
educational and therefore using less pejorative language, and more neutral or positive terms, offering advice 
and practical actions.  
6.4.3  Height of crisis and climax of City response  
The City was slow to respond to the early warning signs of a drought most probably because the threats 
were less perceptible in the early stages (2015 and 2016) and the presumption – based on the high level of 
assurance for the WCWSS – was that winter rains in 2017 would replenish supply dams (Wolski, 2018). 
However, this changed when the City was declared a disaster area in March 2017, implying an increased 
need to communicate the situation to the public. Overall, items released in stream A were more varied and 
spread out, reflecting general City operations and an ongoing process of communicating and justifying City 
activity to the public. Whereas stream B items were more concentrated around the height of the crisis,33 
with high volumes of items being released in October, November and December of 2017.34 However, 
stream A also saw an increase in the volume of items released between October 2017 and January 2018.35 
Together, the hike in communications correlates with the peak of the crisis when the threat of Day Zero 
 
33 While it may have been plausible to expect more educational items when considering public communications, it is 
not surprising that these stream B items only really entered the story around the peak of the crisis. 
34 Stream B had the highest overall items occurring in December 2017. 
35 Stream A had the highest overall items occurring in November 2017. 
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intensified. This trend is reflective of the heavily reactive nature of the City’s response communications 
with the public, a trend observed in many urban crisis responses around the world (Wilhite et al., 2014). 
Stream A frames were more varied than stream B. This could simply be the result of a higher number of 
items being released in stream A over the crisis period. However, it is more likely that this is due to the 
City having to address more nuances in their positioning/status items, whereas the educational/instructional 
items are more focused on providing simple, actionable information. 
6.4.4  Heterogeneity as a strength  
In many ways, the City’s public communications response during the water shortage crisis suggests that the 
City was not prepared for a crisis of this scale and that the drought response was largely reactive, symptom-
orientation, and not always coherent. However, despite the contradictions, ambiguity and lack of clear 
strategies and contingency plans, water consumption was reduced by 43% compared with pre-drought 
consumption levels (City of Cape Town, 2019b). Furthermore, it was largely due to the massive reductions 
in consumption that the WCWSS dams did not run lower than 13,5% and Cape Town circumvented Day 
Zero actualising. By this measure, the City was successful in reaching their ultimate objective of avoiding 
a full-blown crisis where Cape Town’s water supply would be shut-off. It may be true that the City’s 
communications were unidirectional and did not make space for a back-and-forth engagement with the 
public, especially in ‘the City success story’ frame which was neither collaborative nor encouraging. 
However, participatory approaches may have been difficult considering the time sensitivity around 
responding to the crisis (although this may have been better navigated with better contingency planning 
beforehand). Nevertheless, a strong focus on unidirectional and unidimensional communication 
interventions by authorities responsible for managing a crisis is problematic because it fails to account for 
the multidimensional complexities associated with the reality of a drought (Neto, 2016). The same crisis 
can be understood and experienced from many different perspectives and a heterogenous range of frames 
can therefore be effective in targeting multiple audiences or different levels of behaviour change. For this 
reason, successful campaigns often do consist of multiple approaches, possibly with some more intentional 
than others, and these strategies work in combination to reach a diverse public audience (Liang et al., 2018). 
The coexistence of multiple frames can lead to frame pluralism, contradictions, and a failure of frames to 
fully offer meaning, which can make decision-making difficult (Laws & Rein, 2003). While this may be 
true, especially for decision processes, it is also true that single frames can limit drought responses (Vogel 
& Olivier, 2018). While the City received a fair share of criticism for their drought response 
communications (Robins, 2019), it is plausible to think that the heterogeneity of messages in the City’s 
communication responses facilitated a wider range of audiences and responses. The City’s approach was 







Given the inter-reliant relationship between the City and the public for managing water as a resource, it is 
important for managing authorities to be aware of their position of power and to act responsibly in how 
they communicate with the public. This research project analysed how the City of Cape Town framed the 
water crisis (03/2017 – 03/2018) in their official communications made available online to the public, with 
the motivation being to contribute to a better understanding of the role of public communications by city 
municipalities in water crisis management. The project drew on literature on framing as well as water crisis 
management in order to unpack the ways in which framing in communications by authorities influences 
how information is presented to the public and how experiences are subsequently understood. The project 
had three key objectives: to determine the types and characteristics of communication items released by the 
City during the recent water crisis; to determine a range of frames employed by the City in communicating 
the drought; and to analyse trends in the framing of the water crisis messages to identify whether there were 
shifts in framing and messaging throughout the water crisis response period. 
 
In times of extreme water shortage, one of the most effective short-term interventions for reducing 
consumption is to target public behaviour through public communications campaigns (Dolnicar et al., 
2012). This was also true for Cape Town. In the former Mayor’s co-authored book released in 2017, water 
charges and pressure reduction are mentioned for water management but public communications and 
behavioural changes are emphasized as critical for managing a water crisis (De Lille & Kesson, 2017). In 
response to the threat of Day Zero, the City attempted to prompt behaviour change by communicating 
messages relating to water availability, restrictions, City mitigation efforts, and general awareness of non-
wasteful water behaviour. The City was successful in avoiding Day Zero, however, relying so heavily on 
public action to avoid a total shut-down was high-risk because it may have been received reluctantly or 
dismissed. For this reason, there is a need for better planning and more resilient infrastructure. Nevertheless, 
the massive cut in consumption in Cape Town exemplified a city’s ability to conserve large amounts of 




The study used an abductive approach to analyse data. This allowed deductive aspects from literature on 
water crisis management and framing theory to shape and guide the project, while also making space for 
framing aspects to be identified inductively through analysing the data. This combination took into account 
wider knowledge on the subject while also concentrating on details from the data itself and led to a total set 
of key frames specific to the study. Through the analysis process two streams of communications types 
were found; stream A consisted of positioning/status items and stream B consisted of 
instructional/educational items. Six key frames were identified in the City’s communications over the crisis 
period, namely: ‘the City success story’; ‘obscurity and ambiguity’; ‘consumption is key’; ‘the situation is 
controllable’; ‘together we can beat the drought’; and ‘us versus them’. For both streams, a strong overlap 
was found between the ‘consumption is key’ and ‘the situation is controllable’ frames which appeared in 
many items together, indicative of the City’s focus on private consumption reduction to avoid Day Zero 
while promoting their ability to manage the situation and maintain control over the crisis. In stream A, ‘the 
City success story’ also appeared often, highlighting the City’s self-promoting agenda to maintain their 
identity as a capable authority. In stream B, another frame which appeared frequently was ‘together we can 
beat the drought’, which promoted the idea that cooperation and collective effort amongst Cape Town water 
users was critical for avoiding Day Zero. The least used frame was also central to the most strikingly 
contradictory message to come out of the City during the crisis period; ‘us versus them’ went against the 
messages of ‘the situation is controllable’ and ‘together we can beat the drought’ frames and suggested that 
the actualisation of Day Zero would be the result of Cape Town’s misbehaving public, whose lack of 
cooperation made it impossible for the City to maintain control over the situation. The harsh and unfair 
pinning of responsibility on the public may have been the reason for some of the negative public response 
towards the City’s handling of the water crisis. 
 
Frames in stream A were found to be more varied than in stream B, which may be the result of increased 
nuance in stream A content and a more focused instructional value in stream B. For both streams however, 
the increase in communications coincided with the climax of the crisis, reflecting the global trend of 
reactive, symptom-orientated drought response by the City (Wilhite et al., 2014). Yet despite the 
contradictions, ambiguity and lack of clear strategy or contingency planning, water consumption was 
reduced by 43% compared with pre-drought consumption levels in Cape Town (City of Cape Town, 2019b).  
 
Despite being criticised for being unidirectional and non-participatory (Robins, 2019), the City was 
ultimately successful in reaching their objective of avoiding Day Zero. The frames analysis showed that the 
City was less strategic in their communications than they might have liked. However, the study found that 
despite idiosyncrasies, contradictions and lack of strategy, the City’s body of public communications 
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resulted in a heterogenous range of frames which were successful in prompting the public to reduce water 
consumption and thereby delaying and ultimately circumventing Day Zero. The project found that the same 
crisis can be understood and experienced from a multiplicity of differing perspectives and it can be argued 
that the homogeneous range of frames effectively helped to target multiple audiences and different levels 
of behaviour change. Nevertheless, while communication campaigns that push behaviour change have been 
proven to be effective short-term solutions to water crisis (Turner et al., 2016; Buurman, Mens & Dahm, 
2017) and while the City may have successfully navigated the Day Zero crisis, this is not an ideal model 
for water crisis management, especially considering the increased weather variability due to climate change. 
Reactive communications are therefore not a panacea for drought relief, and it should not be the primary 
solution for managing authorities facing water shortage crises.  
 
The City played a central role in producing the dominant frames, situating meaning and facilitating the 
public's understanding of the problems and solutions. Understanding how the City exerted its power and 
set up the framing of the crisis is therefore necessary for understanding the unfolding of the water crisis. 
The precarious nature of Cape Town’s water shortage highlighted that the City, like many others around 
the world, did not have an adequate contingency plan in place to handle a crisis of this nature (Ziervogel, 
2019) and magnitude. This is most likely because it had never been faced with such a crisis and up until 
this point, infrastructure and management for provisioning water had been sufficient to meet demand. 
Increasing variability due to climate change leaves many urban areas vulnerable to weather-related crisis. 
Unfortunately, insufficient policy and provision for crises have resulted in water crisis management which 
is largely reactive, symptom-oriented, and crisis-centred, despite the increasing concern regarding climate 
change, weather variability, and the associated threats for resources such as water (Wilhite et al., 2014).  
 
The study highlighted the interconnectedness between communication, knowledge and behaviour, and that 
understanding how a crisis is framed is important for understanding how public perceptions and reactions 
are influenced by authorities’ messaging. Further research into framing in public communications during 
crisis management periods is useful for investigating effective interventions for crisis management and also 
for understanding public-government dynamics. This project was limited to analysing communications 
made available online by the City and only investigated frames from the City’s unidirectional flow of 
communication in the form of official communication items released to the public. Nevertheless, it was 
able to highlight the dynamic interplay between a managing authority and the public through 
communications. There is potential to research framing in the more complex back-and-forth engagement 
between multiple stakeholders and the City during the water crisis. Similarly, there is potential to conduct 
larger comparative studies of public communication strategies by different urban municipalities responding 
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to water shortage crises around the world. Given the increased likelihood of extreme weather events related 
to climate change and the potential crises it poses for human settlements around the world, it is useful to 
consider communications and framing between authorities responsible for managing a crisis and the public 
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